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Chapter I. Introduction
"There are 51 shares that are worth $250,000.
There are 49 shares that are not worth a - -."'
For years this typified the situation of oppressed minority shares in close
corporations. To understand the potential dramatic consequences of oppression in close
corporation it is in first instance necessary, to outline the specific characteristics of these
corporations. The first chapter concentrates on the peculiarities of close corporations.
Close corporations differ from public corporations. There is no market available for their
shares, the shareholders have greater expectations of participation than shareholders of
public corporations and the relationship between the shareholders is close if not intimate.
It appeared in an early period that the legal corporate framework tailored to the needs of
public corporations did not meet those of close corporations. Some tried to introduce the
necessary flexibility by analogizing close corporations with partnerships. Although these
legal entities share some common characteristics, the analogy is not wholly satisfactory.
Thus, the legislatures intervened by enacting a few special close corporate provisions or
complete close corporate supplements to the existing corporate law. In parallel, the
flexibility of general corporate statute was increased. This first step tempered the curse of
the "49 shares" minority shareholder. The protection provided consists mainly of the right
to draft adapted shareholders agreements. However, the great majority of shareholders is
not capable or willing to bargain for such protection. This unwillingness is paradoxically
caused by the special relationships existing within close corporations and by a efficiency
Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ohio 1956)
1
2v. transaction cost analysis. The most common agreements are briefly cited in the last
chapter. Other protective provisions are unavailable because shareholders often do not
elect for close corporate statute.
Traditional corporate norms, like the majority rule and the business judgment rule
allowed majority shareholders to use a wide range of oppression techniques in almost
complete impunity. However, judicial interpretation of new statutory protections would
open the way to redress the balance between majority and minority shareholders. In fact,
three interlinked factors evolving in parallel deeply changed the position of minority
shareholders in close corporations. Those are 1 ) The broadening interpretation of
"oppression" by the judiciary 2) The increasing willingness to dissolve close corporations
or order a buy out of the shares of the minority 3) Willingness, encouraged by the
enactment of less drastic alternative remedies.
Most states enacted "oppression" as a generic ground for remedial action.
Previously, it was necessary to attack every oppression technique by a remedy available
for the specific technique. It was burdensome to resist a complete scheme of oppression.
While provisions allowing far reaching shareholders agreement partially failed, the
enactment of oppression statutes proved successful. This success was boosted by the ever
broader interpretation courts gave to "oppression". In a first faze courts used a fault based
criteria but rapidly they switched to the reasonable expectation standard. A standard
specifically developed for close corporation participants. The second chapter evaluates
the different standards emphasizing reasonable expectations. Reasonable expectations if
properly limited appears to be an efficient tool to measure oppression.
In other jurisdictions, mainly where oppression is not available as a ground for
dissolution, courts encountered the needs of close corporations by enhancing the owed
fiduciary duties. Thus, in some jurisdiction two cause of action developed, one for
oppression measured by a frustration of reasonable expectations and one for breach of
3fiduciary duties. When "oppression " is available as ground for relief, fiduciary duties
often overlap unnecessarily. Sometimes they supplement the available protection. If
oppression is not available they are indispensable as only generic ground for protection.
Courts recognized, often out of fiduciary duty actions, the right of direct claim.
Derivative claims are required in many oppression cases. This appears to be absurd in
most cases. Derivative action destroys the hope to get an effective relief because the
majority is in control of the corporation to whom the relief will be awarded. The
development of direct actions for traditionally derivative claims is of tremendous
importance.
When in close corporations disagreement is deeply rooted and communication has
broken down, definitive remedies are necessary. This is why slowly courts and statutes
have accepted that minority shareholders petition for involuntary dissolution. The remedy
destroys one of the main characteristics of corporations: permanence! This dissolution
remedy must therefore cautiously be evaluated as a remedy. It is not evident that minority
shareholders (even those who have been systematically oppressed) have the right to
impose such strain on the majority. Protection of minority cannot blind us from the
inherent rights of the majority. Right to control a corporation, define corporate policies
and certainly right not to be deprived of a going concern business. Moreover, to much
power to the minority is a cause of increasing deadlock and dissension. However a
corporation ridden by dissension does not serve anybody, minority nor majority.
Withdrawal must be organized.
Less drastic is the buy out remedy. Where (majority) shareholders buy the
"oppressed" shares. The remedy was initially meant to be an alternative to a requested
dissolution. Later on it could be requested directly to escape oppression without any
reference to dissolution. The remedy is still severe. The financial consequences can be
devastating for the corporations or the majority. It is not a panacea. The procedures are
4complex and valuation often arbitrary. This thesis, while advising that buy out should be
used sparingly, advocates a broader acceptance of the buy out remedy. Nobody can force
an abused shareholder's investment to remain locked in a corporation. Minority have to
share the risks of the enterprise, however, not to an extent that includes oppression by the
majority. Direct action to be bought out provide such remedy without the necessity to
have the corporation liquidated. Buy out is the ultimate solution for the illiquidity
problem of close corporations.
With the buy out remedy a whole list of alternatives where developed to help solve
dissension. Most of those remedies, while seemingly less drastic, do not provide effective
solution for serious dissension. Their ad-hoc character transform obtained relief in a
pyrrhic victory. The minority stays locked in and waits for the next judicial battle.
The three evolutions described above supported by adapted statutory close
corporate provisions, allow to conclude that minority shareholders are not longer helpless
in close corporations. Nowadays, 49 shares are worth a bit , although a precise valuation
is illusory. This is the eternal plight of the minority.
Chapter II. Close Corporations
A. Definition
A close corporation is a corporation "whose shares are not generally traded in the
securities market"2 . This means that the stock is neither listed on any stock exchange nor
traded on an over-the-counter market 3 . Basically, the close corporation has no market for
its shares.
Close corporations however, is a vague concept that can not be grasped by this
narrow definition. A definition focussing only on the lack of market does not encompass
the diversity of the close corporation characteristics. This is why other definitions sum a
list of the main characteristics of close corporations.
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 4, one of the first case recognizing rights of
minority shareholders in close corporations, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
"deemed a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no
ready market for the corporate stock; (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in
the management, direction and operations of the corporation/'
Commentators are more expansive. They list following close corporations
characteristics: (1) the shareholders are few (2) they usually live in the same geographical
:
F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS§ 1.02 (3d ed.
1988) [hereinafter O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS] (Professor O'Neal is "the" leading authority in
close corporations, this thesis as every article concerning close corporations or shareholder oppression
relies often on professor O'Neal's treatise)
3 Forinash v. Daugherty. 697 S.W.2d 294, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Phelps v. Watson-Stillman
Co., 365 Mo. 1124, 1127,293 S. W. 2d 429, 43 1 (1956))
4 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
6area and know each other well (3) management and ownership are substantially identical
Hence, most shareholders participate actively in the business. Usually, they serve as
directors, officers or fulfill other managerial functions. The firm has very few managers
(4) Shareholders treat each other as partners (5) there is no market for the shares. Little or
no trading at all of shares takes place 5 .
As it appears from the enumeration above the second most important attributes of
close corporations, besides the lack of market, are the close relations among shareholders
and the identity between management and ownership. Other definitions of close
corporations give more weight to this relational aspect. Carlos D. Israels defines close
corporations as "an enterprise in corporate form in which management and ownership are
substantially identical 6 ". Finally, some definitions include both characteristics, the lack of
market as well as the tied relationships7 .
For a long time close corporations were only defined by scholars and courts. This
changed with the adoption of close corporations statutes. The model statutory close
corporation supplement of 1982 (hereafter, the "supplement") provides that "corporation
5 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §1 .02, 1.08; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Close corporations and agency costs, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271. 273 (1986) [Hereinafter Easterbrook,
Agency cost](TW\s article has also been published in the new book of Easterbrook and Fischel under the
chapter close corporations. Both are cited indifferently in this thesis. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL
,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 228-252
(1991 )[hereinafter EASTERBROOK'S, CORPORATE LAW]; Don Berger, Statutory Close or Closely
Held Corporations 9
,
1 1 PAC. L. J. 699 (1980)
6 Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporations and the law, 33 Cornell L. Q. 488 ( 1948)[hereinafter Israels.
Close corporations] (Israels is one of the first scholars to draw the attention of the legal community on the
close corporation problem and to plead for the partnership analogy. Concerning the definition of close
corporations he noted that "no satisfactory all purpose definition of a close corporation appears ever to have
been worked out"); The BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (defines close corporations; "A
corporation whose shares, or at least voting shares, are held by a single shareholder or closely-knit group of
shareholders. Generally, there are no public investors and its shareholders are active in the conduct of the
business ")
7 See American Law Institute, Principles ofCorporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 1 .06
(1994)("Closely held corporation means a corporation the equity securities of which are owned by a small
number of persons, and for which no active trading market exists.")
7having 50 or fewer shareholders may become statutory close corporations"8 . The
corporation elects to become a statutory close corporation by including in its articles of
incorporation an explicit statement that the corporation is a "statutory close corporation"
9
.
This definition emphasizes the small number of shareholders aspect, without mentioning
the absence of market. (Infra. II.C. for a discussion of this heavily criticized definition
and the eligibility requirements). Economics, are not neglected in all statutory definitions.
For instance New York and Ohio invalidate shareholders agreements once the shares of
the corporations are traded on the securities market 10 . In other statutes it suffices to show
an intent by electing to become a close corporation. There are no other restrictions or
eligibility requirement whatsoever". Finally, some states do not recognize close
corporations as a form legally distinct from other corporations 12 .
The terms "closed" "close" or "closely held" corporations are interchangeable.
"Closed" emphasizes the willingness to keep outsiders out of the corporations by not
allowing them to become investors. "Closely held" on its turn focuses on the small
number of shareholders and their special relationship 13 . As does the term "incorporated
partnership" used by proponents of the partnership analogy 14 . Others distinguish between
8 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 3(b); Other statutes use numerical restrictions as well. Cf. Az. Rev. St.
Ann. §10-1 803 (A) (3) (maximum ten original investors); See Ann. Cal. Corp. Code § 1 58
(1996)(maximum 35 shareholders at any moment in time); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 342(a)(1) (1996)(limiting
the shareholders to maximum thirty)
q
Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 3(a) (Comment 2) (European legislation distinguishes between private
and public corporations in the companies' name. The American system does not make such a
differentiation)
10 N.Y. Business Corp. Law § 620(c) (McKinney 1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §17101.591(1) (Anderson
1996) (a close corporation may not have his shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly
quoted in the over-the-counter market)
" 865 111. Corp. Stat. Ann 5/ 2a. 10 (West 1996); Md Code Ann. Corp. & Ass'ns. §4-201(1996)
12 Michigan recognized close corporations and has a very liberal statute. Michigan corporate statutes states
Mich. Comp. Laws. § 450.1 103 that "This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying policies which include all of the following:. . .(c) To give special recognition to the legitimate
needs of close corporations" and at § 450.1489 (the possibility to request buy out for corporations for
shares not listed on a national securites exchange).
13 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1.04
14
Ripin v. Atlantic Mercantile Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 444, 98 N.E. 855, 857 (1912)
8the statutory defined "close" corporations and the judicially defined "closely held"
corporations 15 . This paper discusses both, the judicially and statutorily defined close
corporations.
There are also many different types of close corporations. The non-archetypical and
the archetypical close corporation 16 . The latter refers to the small company where
shareholders have familial or other personal relations. Some authors distinguish close
corporations who are owner-managed from those who are not 17 .
The size of the close corporations is not determinative. While most are small
enterprises some are corporate giants worth millions of dollars. However, both encounter
the same problems typical of close corporations 18 .
The economic importance of close corporations is huge. Most of the businesses in
the United States are close corporations from which ninety-five percent are family
owned 19 .
We conclude that the essence of the close corporation problem is the lack of
market20 . The basis for the power of the majority rests on the inability of the minority to
withdraw from the corporations21 . Thus it is this feature that determines the other
15 Gary D. Justis, Comment, Avoiding a minority shareholder oppression claim in a close corporation in
Missouri: the impact ofthe new close corporation statutes, 56 Mo. L. Rev. 257, 263 (1991)
16 See Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Commentary, Filling gaps in the close corporations contract: a transaction
cost analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216, 238 (1992) (using the distinction between archetypical and non
archetypical close corporations to analyze their needs in adaptability opportunism and thus their needs for
stability and limited liability or for the partnership law relationship)
7
Terry A. O'Neill, Self interest and concern in the owner-managedfirm : a suggested approach to
dissolution andfiduciary obligation in close corporations, 22 Seton Hall L. Rev. 646 (1992)
18 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 .03; Carlos D. Israels, The sacred cow of
corporate existence, problems ofdeadlock and dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778 (1952) [hereinafter
Israels, Sacred cow]
|q Steven S. Bahls. Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection ofthe Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15.
J. Corp. L. 285, 287 (1990); George J. Siedel, Close Corporation Law: Michigan, Delaware and the Model
Act, 1 1 Del. J. Corp. L. 383, 384 (1986); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS. 259 n.20 (3d ed. 1983)
20 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 .02
21 J.A.C. Hetherington, Special characteristics, problems, and needs ofthe close corporation, U. 111. L.
Forum 1, 21 ( 1969)[hereinafter Hetherington, Needs ofclose corporations]
9problems arising in close corporations more than any other characteristic. Therefore, we
adhere to Professor O'Neal's "lack of market" definition of a close corporation.
B. Specificities of close corporations
1 . Public corporations v. Close corporations
a. Ownership and control
The classical theory of agency cost as set forward in the 30's by Berle and Means
points out that the main problem of corporations is the separation of ownership and
control22 . Traditional corporate norms give effect to this separation and adjudicate two
different functions to shareholders and directors. While the first provide the capital
necessary for the corporation, the second manages this investment20 . The same duality
does not exist in most close corporations24 . In public corporations, the fear is that the
management will act in its own interest and neglect that of the owner-shareholders. Since,
shareholders posses only an infinite part of the corporation, they act as passive
investors25 . It is not interesting for them, rational investors, to spend much time reading
"ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY, (1933)
23 Robert B. Thompson, Corporate dissolution and shareholders ' reasonable expectations, 66 Wash. U. L.
Q. 193, 194 (1988) [hereinafter Thompson, dissolution]; Frank H. Easterbrook &. Daniel R. Fischel, Close
corporations and agency costs, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271 (1986)
:4 Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder 's Cause ofActionfor Oppression, 48 Bus. Law. 699, 700 (1993)
[hereinafter, Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause]; Henry G. Manner, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and
Economics, 53 VA. L. Rev. 259, 260-261 (1967)
25
O'Neill supra note 17 at 663; See also O'Kelley, supra note 16 at 216 (observing that a simple
dichotomy between close and public corporation distorts reality. There is in fact a continuum ofjointly
owned firms. This observation is correct however it does not invalidate the analyze of the differences
between the two types of corporations)
10
information about their corporation. It is certainly not worth to try to stip out management
policy for the corporation -6 . When displeased by the management, they will not try and
cannot correct the policies. This would be time consuming, instead they sell their shares.
Giving effect to the so called "wall street rule".
Traditional corporate norms are looking for mechanism guaranteeing that managers
will act in shareholders best interest. Rules like free transferability of shares, independent
directors, rules of conduct for directors and other monitoring rules reflect these
concerns
27
. Thus corporate regulations are tailored to protect the weak part of the
equation, the shareholders against the management28 .
In close corporation there is virtually no agency cost problem because management
and ownership is identical. However a different problem of representation arises. The
majority shareholders do not have to take the interests of the minority into account.
Therefore, regardless of the minimized agency cost risks some scholars believe minority
shareholders in close corporations face "unique" risks of oppression29 . Its fair to
conclude, based on the different economical and agency structures of close corporations,
that adapted rules should try to meet their specific needs.
26 Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and Ihe Theory ofthe Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 291-292 (1980)
27
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 278; See O'Neill supra note 1 7 at 665-666 (Other rules of
monitoring are the rights to inspect corporate books and records, the obligation to make public some results
an activities, the rules that refrain the use of anti take-over measures)
28 Many European countries like Germany, Belgium do not face the same problem. The biggest
corporations are privately owned by banks or families. The shares that traded on the stock exchange
represent only an infinite part of the total assets. Since there is no market for corporate takeovers, the
market does not play his monitoring function (See Generally Henry Mann, Mergers and the Marketfor
Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 1 10 (1965)) Moreover, institutional investors, have the skill time and
willingness to be active shareholders. This is a rational decision because the amount of shares they posses is
so important that they can not sell without causing turmoil on the market. They would suffer huge losses.
The problem in these public corporation is to some extent the same problem faced by shareholders in close
corporations: the risk of oppression and squeeze out. Corporate norms should reflect this concerns and
protect minority against majority and not shareholders against management. Note that for instance in the
United Kingdom this is not the case since most shares of public corporations are traded on the stock
exchange.
2q Fama & Jensen, Separation ofownership and control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983): Hetherington &
Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation
Problem. 63 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1977)[hereinafter, Hetherington, Illiquidity]
11
b. Different relationships and expectations
Usually the close corporations is formed by friends, relatives, or other business
associates30 . It is in this context of close relationships, trust and optimism about the future
that the corporations arises. The owners will often not consult a lawyer, bargain for
protective mechanisms or adapted corporate rules31 . Even when they realize the risks they
are often not willing to contract accordingly out of fear of scaring the other investors or
altering the good relationships and the common optimism' 2 . It is thus precisely in the
context where agreements are most needed for protection that non is drawn 3 '. From a
contractual"
4
point of view the close corporations contract will therefore be vague and full
of gaps35 . Implicitly gap-filling authority is given to the majority shareholders and to the
courts
36
.
In a public corporation shareholders expect increasing share value and some
dividends. The shareholders in close corporations have greater expectations37 . They often
have invested a non negligible part of their assets, time and skills in the company. In
30 Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Betrayed, belittled . . . but triumphant: claims in closely
held corporations, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1 173, 1 174 (1996)
' See also Charles W. Murdock, The evolution ofeffective remediesfor minority shareholders and its
impact upon valuation ofminority shares, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 425, 426 (1990) (". . . people enter
closely-held business in the same matter they enter marriage: optimistically and ill-prepared")
j:
Hetherington, Needs ofclose corporations, supra note 21 at 17-18
3 To some extent this is unavoidable. The corporation contract is in general a long term relational contract.
Therefore the contract is necessarily incomplete. Not everything can be foreseen, many issues are not
bargained for. See O'Neill, supra note 17 at 659; O'Kelley, supra note 16 at 247 (There are other reasons
why parties do not contract 1 ) the cost of contracting might exceed the potential benefits 2) investors don't
act in a fully rational way 3) a rational investor might predict that courts will exercise their equitable gap-
filling authority and provide optimal governance rules and structures.)
4 The corporation seen as a nexus of contracts replacing the old view of the corporation as a person. See
O'Neill supra note 17 at 658 (the contractarian approach is suited for close corporations. The relationships
are bargained for. Otherwise the default rules apply)
35 O'Kelley supra note 16 at 216
36 Id
37 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 .08
12
return they expect employment, salary or a dividend as well as key managerial positions38 .
As active investors they want to take part in the management of the business who often is
their principal source of livelihood39 . Unlike in public corporations the pay off for their
investment is not only monetary, but also "dignitary" (the proudness of being the boss in
his own corporation) and "contendeness" (the pleasure to work with selected co-
managers)40 .
c. Illiquidity and its implications
The minority in a close corporation is in a "unique41 " position when it faces
majority oppression. Unlike shareholders in public corporations they are not protected by
the exit option offered by the securities market. The "unique" risk of oppression is thus
attributed to the lack of market. Erroneously, according to some scholars, arguing that if
majority shareholders have cut off every stream of revenues to the minority, the shares of
the minority, even in a perfect liquid market, are not worth anything42 .
Illiquidity damages minority investors in various ways43 :
(1) Valuation of shares is difficult in the absence of market. Transfers even when allowed
are not easily achieved. The transaction cost of illiquid transfers is high. (2) Conflicts may
soon arise concerning dividend policies and other distribution depending on the cash
needs of the shareholders. Lenders will not accept illiquid shares as a collateral. (3) In the
absence of hostile takeovers the market of corporate control does not play his monitoring-
38 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 702
39 Comment, The strict Good Faith standard - Fiduciary* Duties to Minority Shareholders in Close
Corporations, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 595 (1982)
40
O'Neill supra note 1 7 at 668-672
41
Hetherington Needs ofclose corporations, supra note 2 1 at 20; See also supra at n. 29
4:
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 275
43
Id. at 275-277
13
function role. A bad manager team will not be replaced by a better one (4) In an
"uninformed" market an investor has no idea of the real price of the shares.
The absence of market should affect how court and legislatures treat close
corporations44 .
d. The need for adapted rules.
Traditional corporate norms are suited for corporations where ownership and
control are separated. A separate corporate entity with the possibility of perpetual
existence, free transferability of shares, not adapted mechanism for dissension and the
strict formalistic approach45 of corporate law, do not meet the needs of close corporations
actors
46
. There are particularly two traditional rules of corporate law who have
potentially devastating effects: the majority rule and the business judgment rule47 . While
the majority rule can exclude the minority from the decision making process or from any
involvement in the corporation the business judgment rule guarantees the discretion of
these decisions and thus, the non interference of the courts. Both rules are indispensable
for a healthy corporate environment. However, to the extent they lead to excess in the
close corporations context they should be adapted or adaptable (Infra. III.B. for a
discussion of these rules)
44 See O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 .08. (Emphasizing the role courts should
play when invoking the business judgment rule)
45
Id. at § 1.12.8.02
46 Thompson, dissolution, supra note 23 at 195-196
47 See Generally Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse ofthe Business Judgment Rule in the Close
Corporation, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 456 (1985); O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and
Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. Law. 873, 884 (1978)
14
The structural differences between public and close corporations creates also a need
for adapted norms in other areas of corporate law. Those areas are: 48 (1) the control of
admissions to and withdrawal from the corporation (2) the control of the day to day
operation (3) control over basic structural changes in legal organization or proportional
interest of the participants (4) protection of employment and renumeration of individuals
(5) provisions for deadlock and dissolution.
The close corporations needs in those areas must be addressed in three different
ways: adapted regulations, extended contractual freedom and the possibility of
withdrawal.
-Adapted regulations should for instance allow share transferability restrictions.
They guarantee that the investors in the corporations can also function in the close
managerial relationship with the other participants49 . On the other hand restrictions make
the illiquidity problem more acute50 .
-Extended contractual liberty would allow parties to bargain for protection adapted
to their needs. Buy out agreements can help address the problems of illiquidity while
dividend agreements and employment agreements ensure steady streams of income51 .
Parties are often not willing or able to contract (Supra. II.B.l.b ). Adapted close
corporation rules should balance the need for default and mandatory protection with the
need for (unfortunately underutilized) contractual freedom.
-The lack of market being the source of many, if not all, close corporation
problems, involuntary dissolution and buy out should be promoted. However it can be
argued that a to liberal provision increases the risk of minority abuse.
48
Hetherington, Needs ofclose corporations, supra note 2 1 at 4-5; Israels, Close corporations, supra note
6 at 492
49 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 .08; Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5
at 278
50 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 701
51
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 278
15
The great diversity of close corporations begs the question: can it be stated that all
close corporations need adapted rules? It is argued that archetypical close corporations
where there is not much team specific investment, are better served by the partnership
analogy while in non archetypical close corporations traditional corporate law guarantees
the stability of the business52 .
e. Conclusion
Because there is a fundamental difference in structure of ownership and control in
public- and close corporation different corporate norms and standards are necessary.
When commenting the contrast between the two corporate systems there is a risk of
drawing the false conclusion that minority shareholders in close corporations face
"unique" risks of oppression while all shareholders in public corporations face unique
risks of exploitation53 . The risks are present in both scenarios. However they are not
"unique". The different agency cost structures imply different risks 54 . Moreover, the
oppression risk is minimized by the competitive context in which many close corporation
evolve. To attract talents and capital close corporations need to be credible and thus make
believable promises of return on capital or labor investment55 .
On the other hand it can not be denied that only in the close corporation context a
shareholder can be reduced to mere passive lender. When "squeezed-out" and "locked-in"
52 See generally 0'K.elley, supra note 16 (discussing partnership analogy and close corporation needs as
related to the team specific investment)
53 For a definition of oppression (infra. III.). Exploitation refers to the fact that directors are not accountable
to shareholders and thus they can exploit the investment of the shareholders in other ways than in
shareholders best interest (supra. I.B.I. a.).
54
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 273
55 Id at 272
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the minority shareholder does not receive any return on his investment. He is excluded
from participation in earnings and unable to withdraw56 .
Corporate law does not give the majority absolute discretion. But, because the
adaptability mechanism of corporations is the board of directors governed by majority
rule, the corporate structure favors the majority 57 . It is this bias that close corporation
statutes should eliminate and thus make oppression, if not "unique", at least unlikely.
2. The partnership analogy
The close relationships between the members of close corporations is the same as
between partners in a partnership. Since most characteristics of close corporations and
partnerships are identical the idea of using partnership rules in the close corporations
context arose rapidly 58 . Is it not that close corporations are in fact "incorporated
partnerships"?
Already in 1948 Israels noted the identity between close corporation and
partnerships 59 .The partnership analogy has further been fully developed by John
Hetherington and Michael Dooley as a way to protect minority shareholders from the
majority gap-filling authority60 . There are good grounds for applying partnership law to
close corporations. Both entities are characterized by the same kind of close relationships.
This becomes obvious when compared to public corporations61 . Investors in close
56 Hetherington Needs ofclose corporations, supra note 21 at 2
1
S7 0'K.elleysw/?ranote 16 at 240
58 Note that until the end of the 19th century most businesses where organized as partnerships. Incorporation
was a privilege. Charles B. Blackmar, Partnership Precedents in a Corporate setting — Exitfrom the Close
Corporation, 1 J. Corp. L. 237, 238-239 (1982)
59
Israels, Close corporations, supra note 6 at 488, 491 (Participants in close corporation desire to combine
the limited liability of corporation and the decentralized governance of partnerships)
60 O'Kelley.™pranote 16 at 217
61 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, 9-11,(1 976) (comparing the
decision-making process and the common characteristics of partnerships and close corporations)
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corporations or partnerships have approximately equal access to information, for them it
is more efficient to take decision by consensus, both entities are founded by individuals
with strong feeling of trust. Because the close corporations actors treat each other like
partners, the automatic buy out rights, the strict fiduciary duties and equal sharing rules
of partnership law should also be the fundamental principles of corporate law62 .
The view that partnership law is not adapted to corporate needs has also prestigious
proponents. First, they argue, that the analogy is based on a misstatement of partnership
law. The dissolution of partnerships induces liabilities neglected by the analogy.
Moreover, the buy out price in partnership does not include future earnings as do equities.
Second, the gaps in the close corporations contract should be filled with what "parties
would have bargained for. , '' In many cases the corporation form was chosen for all its
characteristics, certainly by the majority shareholders, and not only for the limited
liability or the perceived tax advantage63 . This choice should be respected whatever the
resemblances between partnerships and close corporations.
The partnership analogy, however, remains a useful tool for analyzing the close
corporate context. A more detailed discussion of the analogy will follow when we address
fiduciary duties in close corporations or tackle the problem of dissolution and buy out.
(Infra IV. for discussion of fiduciary duty and V. for discussion of dissolution). To the
extent court increasingly accept individual cause of actions based on breach of fiduciary
duty and broaden the grounds of involuntary dissolution the close corporation law moves
closer to partnership law.
e:
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 2-3
63 See EASTERBROOK'S, CORPORATE LAW. supra note 5 at 249-250
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C. Legislative recognition of the close corporations peculiarities
Legal literature has been the only source of pressure for legal reform in the close
corporate context. The reasons are diverse. Unlike major corporations who lobby to effect
changes in corporate law close corporations are not represented by any organization. The
experience of close corporate actors is isolated and unique, the information not available
and confidential. Hence, the problems defined in the literature are those addressed by the
legislator
64
.
After World War II and especially since the sixties, state legislation was adopted to
accommodate the special needs of close corporations65 . In 1982 the " Model Statutory 7
Close Corporation Supplement" was adopted by the American Bar Association66 . The
adoption boosted the recognition of the need for special close corporation legislation67 .
Some state legislators used the same "integrated" approach as the "supplement" whereby
the articles concerning close corporations are brought together in a comprehensive
supplement to the general corporations law68 . Others adopted various provisions for close
corporations scattered throughout the general corporate law69 . Most integrated codes are
modeled on the Delaware provisions70 . Six states followed the "supplement" pattern71 . A
64
Hetherington Needs ofclose corporations, supra note 21 at 1-4
65 O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. Law. 873 (1978)
66 For a critical analysis of "the supplement" see Richard A. Mann., A critical analysis ofthe statutory- close
corporation supplement to the model business corporation act, 22 Am. Bus. L. J. 289, 336 (1983); Rodman
Elfin, A critique ofthe proposed statutory close corporation supplement to the model business corporation
act. 8 J. Corp L. 439, 454 (1983)
67
Forrest B. Weinberg, The close corporation under Ohio law, 35 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165, 171 (1986)
68 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 § 341-356 (1996); Kansas Corp Ann. 17-7201-7216 (19.96) Pa. Const. Stat.
Ann. Tit. 15 § 2301-37 (1996) (other states who choose the integrated approach are Alabama, Arizona.
California, Washington D.C., Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming)
69 Most states in fact have not chosen for the integrated approach e.g. Michigan, New York (See list at note
68 of those who have an integrated approach); Forrest B. Weinberg, The close corporation under Ohio law,
35 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165, 172(1986)
70 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 55 (special comment- statutory comparison) cites: District of Columbia,
Illinois, Kansas, Philadelphia and to lesser extent Texas; But cf O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS,
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third group of states has opted for a different kind of provisions, mainly Arizona and
Maryland72 . None of the close corporation legislation is self-contained, exclusive law.
General corporations law remains applicable and is only supplemented by close
corporations legislation 7 ^.
The statutes of California, Delaware, Florida, Maine. Maryland, New York, North
and South Carolina are considered to be especially accommodating for close
corporations74 .
The different statute have handled the definition of close corporation in various
ways. The "supplement" for instance, defines and is thus applicable to close corporations
who have elected for close corporate statute by including a statement in the articles of
incorporation7 ^. Are eligible, corporations having fewer than 50 shareholders at the
moment of election and where two-thirds of the holders of the votes approve the
amendment of the articles76 . The definition does not provide for a maximum limit of
shareholders after the election of close corporate statute 77 . The aim is to avoid the
supra note 2 at § 1.18 (ads to the states modeled on the Delaware provisions: Alabama and Nevada. But he
does not consider Illinois Philadelphia and Texas. Those three are classified in the more peculiar third
category with Arizona and Maryland)
71 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1.18 (Georgia, Missouri, Montana, South
Carolina, Wyoming and Wisconsin. Naturally they are not totally identical e.g Georgia has opted for a 50
shareholders limitation for electing, while South Carolina has not)
12 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 55 (special comment- statutory comparison)
73
Forrest B. Weinberg, The close corporation under Ohio law, 35 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165. 172 (1986)
74 HENN, supra note 19 at 178 (note that the Florida statute was repealed in 1975, that for instance North
Carolina and New York have no special provisions for close corporations)
7
- Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 3(a); other states with elective statutes are for instance Delaware,
Kansas, Maryland, Texas. Not all codes require from a corporation to elect close corporation statute)
76 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 3(b); E.g. 805 111. Comp. Stat. 5/2A.10 (in Illinois a corporation can
elect for close corporate statute but their is no ceiling); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1201, 1202 (e.g.
One of the purpose of the Michigan statute is to meet the needs of close corporations. However it does not
recognize close corporations as a separate corporate legal form. Therefore there is no requirements for close
corporations statue disclosure in the articles of incorporation or a defined maximum amount of
shareholders)
77
After election a corporation can have more than 50 shareholders. For other statutes with numerical
limitations see supra note 8
20
automatic termination of close corporations statute above some arbitrary maximum. Even
a public share offering does not cause lose of statute 78 . Is it reasonable to allow
corporations who do not have any more the characteristics or the needs of close
corporations to be still governed by close corporations statutes ? The argument that the 50
shareholders limit at the time of election is there to prevent larger corporations of electing
for close corporations statute 79 supports the view that a ceiling is necessary. Even if it
must be admitted that the risk that some larger corporations will abuse the "supplement"
to avoid some obligations is limited. There is no evidence of any abuse until now80 . This
is maybe the reason why no ceiling is provided for new close corporations 81 .
Another flaw in the definition of the '"supplement"' is that election of close
corporate statute is made for all purposes. Special tailored close corporations provision
like the judicial dissolution do not apply if no election is made. This is in contradiction
with the remedial approach of the law82 .
The issues addressed in the close corporation legislation are, besides the definition
of close corporations, share transfer restrictions, possible shareholders agreements, other
means of modifying the centralized control of the board of directors, broad judicial reliefs
78 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1.02 n.8 (citing Professor Ernest L. Folk's
report to the Delaware Close Corporations Committee pointing out that if the definition excludes
corporations who at one moment in time have regularly traded shares, the lost of statute maybe caused by an
event out of control of the corporation at an not appropriate moment)
7Q Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. §3 (comment)
80 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. §3 (comment); O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §
1 .02; Bradley, An analysis ofthe model close corporation act and a proposed legislative strategy; 1 J.
Corp. L. 817, 820 (1985) (It is unlikely that larger corporation will elect for close corporation statute. The
requirement that all shareholders must consent to a shareholder's agreement refrains this risk See Model
Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 20 (a))
81 The text of the statutes clearly sets a shareholders limit for corporations amending their articles. But a
new corporation does not amend its articles; Some close corporations statutes have limited the amount of
allowed shareholders e.g Del. Code. Ann. tit 8 § 342(a)(1) (in Delaware a close corporation risks losing
statute if its shares are held subsequently by more than 30 shareholders)
8:
Bradley, supra note 80 at 820
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for shareholders dissension and rules regarding informality 8j . The available reliefs are
often divided in three categories: a list of ordinary reliefs including provisional directors
and custodians and two extraordinary reliefs, share purchase and dissolution. 84
Flexibility and a-formalism characterizes the new close corporations legislation 85 .
In many statutes the board of directors86 or the annual shareholders meeting 87 can be
eliminated. The "supplement" provides for share transfer restrictions and right of first
refusal unless stated otherwise in the articles of incorporations. Some state like California
and Delaware provide sanctions when the transfer restrictions are not respected88 . Finally,
the "supplement" validates unanimous written shareholder agreements. Most states allow
substantial contractual freedom 89 .
Statutes with the flexibility of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(hereafter RMBCA) make it possible to achieve desired legal results by the use of
sophisticated contractual shareholders agreements. The "supplement" therefore does not
83 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1.18; HENN, supra note 19 at 699 n.2 .701;
See generally for a comparative study of close corporations legislation, Siedel, supra note 19 . And for a
study of model act, Bradley, supra note 80 at 820 or Robert A. Kessler, The ABA close corporation statute,
36 Mercer L. Rev. 661 (1985)
84 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. §3 (comment 4). The "supplement" adopted a compromise by requiring a
2/3 vote of each class of series of shares, voting as separate voting groups. The Delaware statute for
instance, followed by most states, requires a 2/3 vote of all outstanding shares. Maryland and Texas require
unanimous consent)
85 EASTERBROOK'S, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 5 at 234 (Note an evolution of close corporations
statute towards enabling laws allowing considerable flexibility in structuring the firm and contractual
agreements); EISENBERG, supra note 61 at 9 ( even Professor Eisenberg opponent of contractual model of
public corporations, believes that in close corporations participants should be allowed to adopt governance
structure they pleased.
86
E.g. Md. Code Ann.. Corps. & Ass'ns § 4-302
87
E.g. Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 23(b), Del, Code. Ann. tit. 8 § 351 (all corporate powers can be
given to shareholders)
88 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1.14
89 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 20; See also Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.32 as amended in 1991
(validating all kind of shareholders agreements without requiring an election of close corporations statute);
See Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 704 (Most states expanded the ability of parties in
close corporations to contract around the majority rule and centralized control to protect jobs and salaries);
O'Kelley, supra note 16 at 242-245 (for a general discussion of the need of contractual modifications in the
different types of close corporations)
22
significantly changes the results obtainable under the RMBCA. However it provides
certainty, flexibility and lowers the transaction cost since less drafting is required' . As a
matter of fact only a few corporation elect for close corporations statute. The lack of
acquaintance with the "supplement" explains only partially this disinterest since the
"supplement" is not disadvantageous to close corporations41 . In fact in a minority
shareholders oppression case it is of little importance whether a close corporations is also
a statutory close corporations92 .
D. Changes injudicial attitudes
Not only the legislators but also the court have learned to recognize the specific
needs of close corporations9^ Courts are increasingly willing to recognize shareholders
agreement modifying traditional corporate norms94 . This was not the case in the early
Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. (introductory comment); Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 283
(Corporate law is a set of standard terms that lowers the costs of contracting. Importance of statutes has
been exaggerated. They track the terms people have been negotiating for years)
91 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1.19
9:
Justis, supra note 15 at 265-266 (the only difference between a corporation who elected close corporation
statute. Is that under RMBCA minority shareholders in statutory close corporations must show that they
have exhausted all forms of nonjudicial remedies before they can file a lawsuit for oppression); Berger
supra note 5 at 703-708 (A thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of electing close
corporate statute, especially in California. He cites as advantages: 1) Some optional provisions can be
drafted in shareholder agreement and do not need. to be in the charter 2) ability to bargain for partnership
rules 3) flexibility on voting and shareholders agreement. As disadvantages 1) higher risk of lock-in because
of share transfer restriction 2) Petition for involuntary dissolution can be filed by any shareholder while in
non statutory close corporation the shareholder must own a substantial amount of shares, Cal. Corp. Code §
1800 (a)(2). This provision results in a high harassment potential. (The second disadvantage of Berger is
debatable. See infra. V. the discussion on dissolution))
93 See Generally, Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 699 (for a discussion of the general
trends); O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 . 20
94
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 279-283
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years of McQuade v. Stoneham95 . But nowadays shareholders agreement are controlled by
Clarck v. Dodge 96 and Galler v. Galler } . The liberal contractual attitude of courts is
supported by most new statutes48 . Furthermore, influenced by the partnership analogy,
courts, invoke a heightened standard of fiduciary duty for close corporations. The
majority shareholders owe the minority "utmost good faith and loyalty" 99 (infra IV. for a
discussion of fiduciary duties). But the most impressive change over the last decennia has
been on the remedies issue. While courts originally viewed dissolution as drastic and
granted the remedy sparingly their seems now to be greater readiness to do so 100 .
Alongside the dissolution remedy a wide variety of equitable solution have been
developed. For instance an order to compel dividend, appointment of custodians or
provisional directors, imposed buy outs, repeal of boards decisions. The role of courts is
increasingly important in that area since statutes give them broad discretion in choosing
the appropriate remedies 101 .
Courts activism has two drawbacks. Courts gap-filling decisions create a
disincentive for parties to draft a contract wherein they set out the balance they wish to
achieve between opportunism (^partnership rules) and (collective) adaptability (^majority
95263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). (Where the court invalidated an agreement between shareholders to
use the best effort to vote for each other as directors and officers. By deciding so the court allowed
Stoneham to welch on the guarantees that induced McQuade to invest in the corporation. "A contract is
illegal and void so far as it precludes the board of directors, at the risk of incurring legal liability, from
changing officers, salaries, or policies retaining individuals in office, except by consent of the parties")
96 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) (allowed a minority shareholders to enforce an agreement granting
him the right to stay in office and receive one forth of net income as salary or dividend so long as he was
"faithful, efficient and competent); See also Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 1 12. 60 N.E. 2d 829
(1945) (reaffirming the majority rule.)
97 32 111.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). (Broadly interpreted this case validates all agreements in close
corporations absent prejudice to third parties (and not in direct contravention of a statute). An agreement
providing for salary and dividend payment was upheld.). See also Zion v. Kurtz. 50 NY2d 92, 428 NYS2d
199 (1980) (liberal towards allowed shareholders agreements not respecting formalities imposed by statute
but conform with statute)
98
Supra, note 89
99 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578 at 593
100
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 286
101 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §1.20
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Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 286
101 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §1.20
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rule). Furthermore every time courts err by applying partnership rules to corporations
where the rational investors "would not have wanted " those rules, courts devaluate the
close corporate form 102 .
However, the total picture of courts decisions is positive. Courts flexibility,
enforcing various shareholders agreements, scrutiny applying higher standards of
fiduciary duty and increased readiness to dissolve corporations or tailor adapted remedies
has created a healthier environment in which minority shareholders fear less to be
deprived of any return on investment. But, the more legislatures and courts allow
participants in close corporations to structure their relations by agreement and to contract
for partnership veto powers, the more deadlock and stalemate cases will arise 103 .
102 O'Kelley, supra note 16 at 247
103
Israels, Sacred cow, supra note 18 at 781
Chapter III. Oppression
A. In concreto
The participant in the close corporation venture might decide one day to eliminate
or at least reduce the influence of one or more co-venturers. The underlying reasons can
be diverse, going from greediness to perfectly rational business decisions based on the
performance and behavior of the co-venturer. O'Neal's oppression treatise list many of
those grounds e.g.: greed, desire for power, family quarrels, conflict of interest,
disagreement over policy, inactive shareholder, death of key shareholder, drive of
superior talent, aged founder who "hangs on" and so on' 04 .
In doing so, shareholders can use a wide variety of techniques which can be
categorized in two groups. Those leading to a cash-out of the unwanted shareholders and
those where while the shareholders loses every influence and return on investments, he is
not bought out. The second situation where a shareholder although "squeezed-out" or
"frozen-out'" stays
ww
locked-n~T is common to close corporations 105 . In a public
corporation, though maybe unwilling, the shareholder can always sell his shares. He is
never "locked-in".
104
F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS §2 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION] (O'Neal is not only the
grandfather of the close corporations legislation but also a leading authority in minority oppression)
105 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §8.13
25
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Cash out techniques are usualy related to mergers or share exchange. Like for
instance: reverse stock-split, buy out of already excluded minority while witholding
information about share value, merger consolidation, compulsory share exchange 106 . Non
cash-out squeeze-out techniques are: witholding dividends, elimination from the board of
directors and from company's employment, high compensation to majority and other
techniques of siphoning earnings, denial of acces to books and records and other sources
of information, misappropriation of corporate assets for personal use or by a company
controlled by the majority and so on 107
To most of this squeeze out techniques, their are appropriate remedies. Unfair
mergers can be challenged with the rules governing mergers, the right of access to
corporate books and records is explicitly provided in the corporate law, misappropriation
of corporate opportunities and assets can also be challenged. However all those legal
battles the minority is fighting, even when won, are just another pyrrhic victory. The
majority stays in control, the minority remains locked-in, and the game off oppression
continues. At one point in time it is necessary to allow the minority to withdraw it's
investment under fair conditions. A close corporation can not work when parties are not
willing any more to cooperate. It is here that the dissolution and buy out remedy pop-in,
as last resort and definitive remedy for oppression.
106 O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §3:02; O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra
note 2 at § 8.13
107 O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §3:02; See also Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1639 ( 1961 ) (describing those techniques one by one)
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B. General principles of corporate law
It has already been stated that some scholars contend that minority shareholders in
close corporations face "unique'" risks of oppression. This is so because the general
principles of corporate law ignore the peculiarity of close corporations. The majority rule
and the business judgment rule are the two principles making the use of the wide range of
oppression techniques described above legal and difficult to challenge.
1. Shareholder Democracy, Majority Rule and Centralized Control.
Those possessing the majority of the shares elect the board of directors. Normally
the whole board or at least the majority of the board if their is a cumulative voting
provision. The board of directors is invested with "all corporate powers". "(That) shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitations set forth
in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under section 7.32 108".
Normally, a majority vote is sufficient to have a decision taken by the board. The scheme
is clear. Unless the minority has bargained for some protection and restrictions of the
power of the majority, they will not be heard 109 . Those with the majority control the
corporation. This is not an anomaly, since they invested more than others, they bear
higher risks and thus should be able to control this risks. Lets not forget however, that in
close corporations there are no market forces present to counter the centralized control' 10 .
08 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b)
O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at § 1 :03
O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 1 . 1
5
i
109
I 10
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2. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is an evidentiary presumption that directors act in
accordance with their duty of care" 1 . The business judgment rule requires judicial
deference to corporate decisions. The judge-made rule guarantees non-interference by the
courts and thus immunizes partially management from liability" 2 .
Limitations to the protection afforded by the business judgment rule have been set
out mAronson v. Lewis 1 ' 3 : only disinterested directors, who make informed decisions, are
protected. The protection has even been more limited by courts in cases concerning
special litigation committee's of public corporations deciding on the opportunity of
derivative suits" 4 . With the exception of those cases, courts expect proof of "gross
negligence" to challenge a business decision" 5 . Only then, when the rule has been
rebutted, will courts scrutinize the decision to its intrinsic fairness to the corporation and
the corporation's minority shareholders" 6 . Fraud, lack of reasonable care and self dealing
are not protected" 7 .
The rule is justified by the belief that it reassures capable mangers, encourages risk
taking and deters risk of abuse of derivative litigation. Although, reassuring the managers
in close corporations is not needed as much as in public corporations. The threat of
litigation by shareholders is not so serious in close corporations since the shareholders are
"' Smith v. Van Gorkem. 488 A.2d 858. 872 (Del. 1985)(If the board takes an informed decision, the
decision is protected. The duty of care is a process duty not a qualitative duty)
112 HENN, supra note 19 at 661-663
" 3 473A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
114 Zapata Corp. V. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert,
denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983)
115 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
" b Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 469 N.E. 2d 959, 963-964 (Ohio
1986)
117
J.C. Bruno, "Reasonable expectations"— a primer on an oppressive standard (part 2 of2), 71 Mich.
B.J. 566, 570(1992)
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often the managers of the company. Hence, risk taking in close corporation is not only
based on sound business judgment but often on non-business motivations. The business
judgment rule can not cover the complex web of relationships existing in close
corporations" 8 .
The classical argument supportive of the business judgment rule states that it is not
the function of the judge to review business judgment. He lacks expertise. How true this
may be, at some point, the judge has to interfere. Why not accept that in the close
corporations the room to maneuver of the majority is narrower? Less than the traditional
bad faith requirement should be required to trigger an intervention of the judge 119 . Judges
already have accepted to replace their own business judgment in control over derivative
litigation issues 120 . Moreover, courts often second guess other types of professionals like
psychiatrists and architects 121 .
The basic problem is that the business judgment rule is based on assumptions that
are not present in close corporations. Directors who are at the same time shareholders and
employee, lack independence. The external factors of control that regulate management
conduct and (ab)use of the business judgment rule like the securities market and the
securities market regulations do not play a role in close corporations 122 . The business
judgment rule is in fact a mechanism enhancing shareholder passivity, only useful in
public corporation where the active role must be confined to the managers. This for
obvious practical reasons 123 .
118 Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse ofthe Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60
Notre Dame L. Rev. 456, 483-484 (1985) (See also generally, this article for a complete discussion of the
role of the business judgment rule in close corporations)
19
Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 484-485
:o See supra note 1 14 and accompanying text
:
' O'Neill supra note 17 at 682
::
Id. at 68 1 ; Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 485-486; Justis, supra note 1 5 at 272-273
23 O'Neill supra note 17 at 679-682
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Few have questioned the application of the business judgment rule in the close
corporation context 124 . However, a to strict application in this context has dramatic results
since all decisions concerning, dividend policy, employment and compensation, stock
issuance and dissolution either originate in the board or directors or are ultimately
decided there 125 .
An example on the dividend policy issue shows this. Courts in Gottfried v.
Gottfried'
26
and Ziddel v. Ziddelni refused to review dividend policies if the bad faith of
the board was not proven. The bad faith requirement is the result of the business
judgment rule presumptive protection. Thus, usually the business judgment rule applied
in the close corporate context is not able to take personal and other specific
considerations typical of close corporations into account 128 . However the business
judgment rule is not unlimited. In Dodge v Ford Motor Co 129 , the court stated that bad
faith can be found if the company builds up an unreasonably large cash reserve. A
statement helpful to have dividend policies reviewed in close corporations.
Other criteria of evaluating business decisions do not prove to be more satisfactory
than the business judgment rule. The intrinsic fairness test, for instance, shifts the burden
of proof to the directors. But the question remains to whom the decision must be fair: to
the corporation, to the majority or to the minority ? 130 (Infra. IV for a discussion of the
duty of the majority towards the minority).
The better approach may be to narrow down the protection afforded by the business
judgment rule in close corporations. Keeping in mind that the rule remains useful in many
1:4
Peeples supra note 1 18 at 467; O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §3 9.04
125 Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 468-469
126 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (Sup. Court. 1947)
127 277 Or. 413. 560 P.2d 1086 (1977)
128 Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 472
,:q Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 204 Mich 459, 509 (1919)
130
Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 492-494 (to the extent one knows what "fair" means)
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situations where business decisions are made that do not affect minority shareholders
expectations
'
,l
. Protection of business judgment is essential for a corporation to be
managed efficiently, profitably and to allow risk taking by the majority 1 "' 2 . A flexible
interpretation of the rule in close corporations will guarantee protection for "non
oppressive" business decision and at the same time permit courts intervention so as to
protect minorities. A step in the good direction, but certainly not satisfactory, is the less
harmful means doctrine that permits a showing by the minority that a protected business
decision could be executed in a less harmful way 13j .
C. Legislative definition of "oppression techniques"
"Oppression" is the generic legal term that encompasses all the "oppression
techniques" described above. While most oppressive techniques can be challenged
individually without need for a generic term, some cannot. Moreover, as we concluded
above, it makes little sense to fight each oppressive conduct on a separate legal ground.
This approach does not offer a real, permanent solution l34 . This is why many statutes
began to include oppression or similar language as a general ground for relief135 .
131
O'Neill supra note 17 at 683 (giving an example with a corporation purchasing raw material from one
purchaser rather than another. In this case "it is legitimate to conclude that all parties had agreed, at the
outset, to be bound by the majority's vote") (See infra. III. E. 2, reasonable expectations preempts business
judgment rule)
132 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 429
133 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-849, 353 N.E. 2d 657, 661 (1976) (this
case is. a major case for close corporations and will be discussed thoroughly); Peeples supra note 1 18 at
499-500; Justis, supra note 15 at 273-274 (discussing which courts applied the "legitimate business
purpose" test (= less harmful means) in close corporations e.g. Georgia yes, Missouri no)
134 See supra III. A.
135
In New York for instance only for close corporations, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1 104-a, in the MBCA for
instance for all corporations, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30
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Oppression as a basis for relief is noteworthy because it breaks the myth that only a
harm to the corporation can be compensated. The term oppression is a recognition in
itself of the rights of the minority by the legislatures^ 6 . It is useless to consider
"oppression" isolated. It is in fact intimately linked to the reliefs it makes available,
especially to dissolution and buy-out 1 " 7 . Nowadays most statute list "oppression" as a
ground for dissolution. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of oppression
and the reasonable expectations doctrine includes a discussion of the advantages of
dissolution and vice versa. Many arguments in this discussion are, if not the same, closely
related to each other (Infra V. Judicial dissolution).
Oppression as a ground for relief was first included in Illinois and Pennsylvania in
1933, in the MBCA in 1946 and in the English Company Act of 1948 138 . The MBCA
grants judicial dissolution for "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" conduct 139 . Most states,
like the MBCA, also grant dissolution for waste and fraud 140 . Thirty-one states included
oppression in their statutes and six have similar language 141 . Four states use the words
"unfairly prejudicial" instead of "oppressive" 142 . Both terms are considered to be closely
related. Because of the link with the dissolution remedy the statutes were not widely used
in the beginning. This was caused by the traditional unwillingness of courts to dissolve a
30 Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration ofthe
Relative Permanence ofPartnerships and Close Corporations, 67:1 Minnesota L. Rev. 1, 39 (1982)
137 Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 718 ("Consideration of the broadened use of the
oppression action is incomplete without also focussing on the remedy provided if oppression is found")
138 Id at 709 (citing, 1933 111. Laws 308. 351; MBCA § 90, reprinted in 6 Bus. Law. 1, 75-76 (1950);
Companies Act 1948 §210)
139 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30
140 Examples; Harry J. Haynsworth, The effectiveness ofinvoluntary dissolution suits as a remedyfor close
corporation dissension, 35.1 Clev. St. L. Rev. 25, 35-36 (1987) (Noting courts have place fraud, illegality,
waste or misapplication of corporate assets in one category and that in a second category they have placed
oppression, unfairly prejudicial and persistent unfairness)
141 Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 709 n. 70 (for a list of those states)
142
Id. (those are Alaska, California (see also infra note 150 and accompanying text, the second very broad
ground that California has) , Minnesota and North Dakota)
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going concern enterprise 143 . On the other hand it can be stated that the inclusion of
"oppression" in statutes has opened "a much broader avenue of relief" for minorities 144 .
While many statutes have adopted the '"oppressive terminology" most have
declined to define the term. The official comment to the "supplement" expressly indicates
that no attempt is made to statutorily define oppression, so as to leave these "elastic
terms"' to a case by case judicial interpretation 145 . Minnesota and North Dakota have
expressly adopted the reasonable expectations standard to interpret "oppression'" in their
legislation
146
. In a 1994 amendment, Minnesota's "reasonable expectations" language
was changed to "reasonable expectations of all shareholders" 147 . In the buy out provision
the legislature added a presumption that written shareholders agreement reflect the
reasonable expectations for the matter addressed in the agreement 148 .
A substantially different terminology is found in North Carolina 149 and
California 150 . Their statutes provide minority relief when "reasonably necessary to protect
the rights and interests" of the shareholder. However, the judiciary of both adopted the
reasonable expectation standard to define the "rights and interests of shareholders'". The
terminology focusses the attention of the court on the rights of the minority and seems to
be broader than "oppression"". Maryland has also a very broad (close corporation) statute:
"there is such internal dissension among the stockholders of the corporations that the
143 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 709
144
Arthur D. Spratlin, Jr. Comment, Modern Remediesfor oppression in the closely held corporation, 60
Miss. L. J. 405, 409 (1990) (quoting. O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §9.29)
145 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 40 (official comment 2.)
146 Minn. Stat. Ann. 302A.75 1 ; ND Cent Code §10-191-115
147 Minn. Stat. Ann. 302A.751 subsection 3(a)
148
Id. (Previously courts refused to follow the plain language of shareholders or employment agreements)
149 N.C. Gen. Stat .§ 55-125(a)(4) (replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. 55-14-30) and § 55: 125.1 (replaced by
NCGenStat 55-14-30 and 55-14-31) (in 1990 North Carolina significantly amended its business corporation
act and eliminated the alternative relief section. Courts have only power to grant dissolution and buy out)
150
Cal. Corp. Code § 1800 (b)(5) (remember that California also has the"unfairly prejudicial" terminology);
See also Alaska stat. § 10.06.628(b)(5)
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business and affairs of the eorporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the
stockholders generally" 151 . Connecticut provides dissolution for "fraud, collusion or gross
mismanagement" or for "any good and sufficient reason" 152 . Thompson classifies the
remaining states in three groups those states that list "illegality or fraud", those that only
list "deadlock" and finally those states that have no statutory ground for a shareholder to
seek dissolution 153 .
"Oppression" or other triggering terms like "unfairly prejudicial" can also be
limited towards the persons to whom they apply. Most statutes do not list exhaustively in
what capacity a shareholder must be oppressed but only provide a general "right of a
shareholder to request dissolution" 154 . Nevertheless "oppression" is generally viewed as
including oppression towards "shareholders in their capacities as directors, officers or
employees". In that way a decision is avoided stating that the shareholders can only act in
their capacity as shareholder while in most close corporations cases relief is needed in the
capacity of employee or officer 155 .
We conclude that it is necessary to have a generic term for a scheme of oppression
techniques to trigger relief. Which is the better term: "oppression", "unfairly prejudicial",
"the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the stockholders
generally"or "reasonably necessary to protect the rights and interests of shareholders"? To
the contrary of what one might think it does not matter that much. What matters is the
standard that will be used to interpret and define oppression. But if a choice must be
151 Md Code Ann., Corps & Ass'ns § 4-602 (1996)
15: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-382
153 Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 709 n. 70 (The first group: Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine
Nevada, Florida (misapplication of assets or waste). The second group: Arizona .Washington D.C.. Indiana,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Louisiana. The third group: Delaware (but a special agreement is possible for close
corporations) Kansas and Oklahoma)
154
But See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751 (as shareholder, director, officer or employee); S.C. Code Ann. §
33-14-300 (as shareholder, director or officer)
155 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 7 14 (alluding to the restrictive interpretation in
English company law)
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made "oppression" seems the most appropriate. Its "common sense" meaning depicts
well the situation which the legislator has in mind. While the other terms are or to vague
("interest of shareholders") or refer unnecessarily to "fairness" a concept closely related
to fault.
D. Judicial definition of "oppression": evolution from a fault based standard to reasonable
expectations
The evolution of the interpretation of "oppression" evolves in parallel with the
understanding and acceptance by the judiciary and the legislatures of the special
characteristics of close corporations 156 . This growing awareness allowed a permanent
broadening of the interpretation of oppression. Judicially, the term has also eluded a clear
definition. The descriptions of "oppression" are dependent of the specific factual setting
of the case 157 . The undefmedness and factualness of "oppression" has not prevent a search
for a "standard" of oppression.
The very first decisions interpreting oppression were very restrictive because of the
link with dissolution and the fear of abuse by the minority 158 . Oppression allowing
dissolution was only found in "extraordinary circumstances" 159 or "if corporate ruin will
inevitably follow" 160 and thus "in the context of corporation's overall financial picture 161 ".
156 Id at 711
157
Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 488
158 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 709-7 1 1
159 Lynch v. Buchanan
,
377 A.2d 592, 594 (Md. Court. Spec. App. 1977)
160
Barnett v. International Tennis Corp., 263 N.W.2d 908, 918 (Mich. Court. App. 1978)
161 Gary v. Hall 295 N.E.2d 506 (111. App. Court. 1973); See Generally, Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation,
What amounts to "oppressive " conduct under statute authorising dissolution ofcorporation at suit of
minority stockholders, 56 A.L.R. 3d 358 (Suppl. 1996)
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The second wave of decisions used a fault based approach 162 . Oppression as a
departure from the notions of fair play and fair dealing defined as "burdensome, harsh
and wrongful conduct 1631 '. Fiduciary duties was seen as a concept adapted to close
corporations. Thus some courts explicitly made the link to an action for breach of
fiduciary duty 16
"4
. While in Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Davis 16 ' "oppression"
was recognized as a separate cause of action distinct from fraud (and illegality) in White
v. Perkins' 66 and Baker v. Commercial Body Builders' 6 the courts used the fiduciary duty
of good faith and fair dealing (fair play) to find oppression. This fault based approach has
first been developed in English company law 168 .
Not surprisingly, it appeared to be very difficult to define standards of fair dealing
and fair play. Moreover, those standard could not cover typical oppression situations in
close corporations. For instance where the majority acting without fault "squeezes" the
minority out of the corporation.
The parallel development of alternatives to dissolution freed the courts to broaden
the scope of oppressive conduct and allowed them to adopt the reasonable expectations
standard 169 . The standards departs from the bargain struck by parties and does not require
any fault. The idea beyond the reasonable expectation doctrine is to find the hypothetical
162 Sandra K. Miller, Should the definition ofoppressive conduct by majority shareholders exclude a
consideration ofethical conduct and business purpose?, 97 Dick. L. Rev. 227, 236 (1993)
163 Skiera v. Skiera Bros., Inc. 629 P.2d 214, 221 (Mont. 1981)
164 Some courts went further and adapted fiduciary duties to close corporations by using a strict standard of
"utmost good faith and loyalty" for a discussion of this approach see infra. IV
165 141 N.E.2d 45, 49(111. 1957)
166 189S.E. 2d315(Va. 1972)
167 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973); See also recently, Giannoti v. Hamway 387 S.E.2d 725, 730 (Va. 1990) (fair
dealing standard)
168
Peeples supra note 1 18 at 501 ("the parties', reasonable expectations could be described as an implied
multilateral contract among the shareholders); Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy 433 N.Y.S. 2d 359, 365
(N .Y.Sup. Court. 1980) ("these reasonable expectations constitute the bargain of the parties in light of
which subsequent conduct must be appraised")
169 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 458, 46; The gradual general acceptance of dissolution as a valid remedy
played naturally the same role
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bargain between the parties such as to allow courts to fill in the gaps of the contract 17".
Broadly interpreted there is "oppression" when reasonable expectations are frustrated 171 .
A growing number ofjurisdiction have adopted the reasonable expectations
standard to define oppression, are among those: Alaska, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, West Virginia 172 .
Reasonable expectations has also been adopted by some courts as standard for equitable
jurisdiction independent from the standard for "oppression" 173 .
The question remains if the reasonable expectation test is "the" new, exclusive, test.
In Gimpel v. Bolstein' 4 the court found that when necessary both tests can be combined
to define oppressive conduct. They could not use the reasonable expectation test because
plaintiff inherited the shares and also stole form the corporation, (see infra III.E.4. for a
comparative comment on the two standards)
Naturally, not every state switched over to the reasonable expectations standard.
Michigan for instance did not for an interpretation of its statute granting equitable relief
for "illegal, fraudulent or willfully unfair and oppressive" conduct 175 . The showing
required is that of a fault like fraud, abuse of trust or misappropriation of corporate
funds 176 .
170
Michael E. DeBow, Oppression ofminority shareholders: contract, no tort, 54 Ala. Law 128 (1993);
See, Donald F. Clifford, Jr., Close Corporations Shareholder Reasonable Expectations: the larger context,
22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 41 (1987) (for a discussion of reasonable expectations in other branches of the
law like contracts law, insurance law, law of tort and so on)
171 Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy 433 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (N.Y.Sup. Court. 1980)
172 See e.g., Miller, supra note 162 at 234 n. 13; J.C. Bruno, "Reasonable expectations" — a primer on an
oppressive standard (part 1 of2), 71 Mich. B.J. 434. 435-437 (1992) (discussing the cases); See also supra
at note 146 Minnesota and North Dakota explicitly integrated the reasonable expectation standard in their
legislation
173 North Carolina and California provide for minority relief when "reasonably necessary to protect the
rights and interests" of the shareholder. See supra note 150
174 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020 (N.Y.Sup. Court. 1984)
175 Mich. Stat. Ann. §450.1489
176
Bruno, supra note 1 17 at 568
38
E. Reasonable Expectations
1 . Creation and evolution of the reasonable expectations doctrine
Reasonable expectations is a standard adapted to the special expectations of close
corporation actors i.e., expectations of active involvement, employment and return on
investment. The first to suggest that "reasonable expectations" as standard for oppression
in close corporations is Allen Afterman, an Australian scholar 177 . In the U.S. Professor
O'Neal has been the driving force behind the reasonable expectations standard 178 . The
reasonable expectations standard was also supported by an interpretation the House of
Lords gave to the British Companies Act 179 .
The New Jersey court in Exadactilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co. I80
,
is one of the
first courts to explicitly use the expectations terminology and to link the expectations
with the special close corporate context. The court refused relief because the plaintiff did
not fulfill the expectations of the majority because he had not learned the business. But
the standard was primarily developed by New York Courts like in Topper v. Park
Sheraton Pharmacy""' where the court held that the discharge of a minority shareholder
from his employment for cause and of his officer position was oppressive. That the
shareholder was discharged for cause or as result of business judgment was irrelevant.
The severe damage of expectations sufficient was the ground for oppression. Topper goes
177
Afterman, Statutory Protectionfor Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Modelfor Reform, 55 Va. L.
Rev. 1043(1969)
178 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §9.29
179 Ebrahami v. Westbourne Galeries Ltd. 2 All E.R. [1972] 492, 2 W.L.R. 1289
180 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. Court 1979)('The special circumstances, arrangements and personal
relationships that frequently underlay the formation of close corporations generate certain expectations
among the shareholders concerning their respective roles in corporate affairs, including management and
earnings")(the court also discussed the difference of expectations in a "large corporation" and in a "close
corporation".)
18l 433N.Y.S.2d359(N.Y.Sup. Court. 1980)
39
very far, too far for some in that it does not allow a legitimate business purpose to be a
valid defense 182 . From the beginning reasonable expectations has made the risk of abuse
by the minority a serious threat.
The reasonable expectations standard is potentially to broad so it was necessary for
courts to narrow it down. In Meiselman v. Meiselman' s3 the court set some limits to the
reasonable expectations standard. The plaintiff must prove that 1) he had reasonable
expectations. 2) they must be substantial. 3) with the accent on the word "reasonable",
only disclosed expectations will be taken into account. That is the expectations known or
assumed by the other participants. 4) the frustration of expectations is not the result of
plaintiffs fault and is in large part beyond his control 5) under all circumstances the
plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief. 6) reasonable expectations are those
that developed throughout the "entire history of the participants relationship". "History"
includes the "expectations at the inception of the participants relationship . . .and those as
altered over time . . . Even the expectations which develop as the participants engage in
course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the corporation"
Professor Thompson in his turn cited following considerations that shape relief
when reasonable expectations is applied 18 "4 : 1) Expectations need not be evidenced by a
written instrument. They can be gleaned from written document and conduct. The burden
of proof remains on the plaintiff. 2) Expectations must be important to investor's
participation. The expectation must be "substantially" defeated. A case by case analysis
is essential. 3) Expectations must be known to the other parties 4) Relevant expectations
are those at inception of the enterprise and those that develop thereafter. Furthermore
courts should not grant relief for failure to achieve expectations within a reasonable time
l8: Bruno, supra note 1 1 7 at 435
183 307S.E.2d551 (N.C. 1983)
184 Thompson's, dissolution, supra note 23 at 215-228 (for the other considerations see infra. III.E.2. and 3.
the disadvantages and advantages of reasonable expectations)
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period. It would suffice that the majority shows that there is a significant probability that
expectations will be fulfilled 185 .
re Kemp & Beatly, Inc.'*6 is a typical case of application of the reasonable
expectations doctrine. The court limited expectations further in that it provided that it will
not grant relief for frustrated expectations of a minority shareholder acting in bad faith.
After the minority shareholders-employees were fired a long standing dividend policy of
awarding de facto dividends was changed. A classical situation of "frozen-out" but
"locked in" petitioner. The court granted dissolution and optional buy out. The court
pointed out that to determine expectations a case by case approach is necessary. In fact
expectations are not only those developed throughout the "entire history of the
participants relationship" but are expanded to a corporation by corporation, shareholder
by shareholder analysis.
An example of expansive interpretation of reasonable expectations is Pedro v.
Pedro ni . The court found in favor of a sympathetic plaintiff that reasonable expectations
can include an implied agreement to provide lifetime employment. This, in total
contradiction with the employment at will doctrine 188 .
Burack v. /. Burack, Inc.,'*9 narrowed the standard further down by stating that
"oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority's conduct substantially
defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the
circumstances and were central to the petitioners decision to join the venture". Does
185
Hillman, supra note 136 at 79
l86 473N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984)
187 489 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. Court. App. 1992)
188 See generally Sandra L. Schlafge, Pedro v. Pedro: consequencesfor closely held corporations and the
at-will doctrine in Minnesota, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1071 (1992) (for a complete discussion of the clash
between pedro and the at-will doctrine. Arguing that pedro goes too far)
180 524 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (same statement was already made in re Kemp & Beatly)
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"objectively viewed" replace a minority shareholder perspective or a "for the benefit of
the corporation" perspective?
Obviously, reasonable expectations is a very broad concept. It was and still is
necessary to narrow it down otherwise, corporate stability of investment will be put at
stake. A to broad interpretation allocates the risk of corporate failure on the majority not
able anymore to meet expectations of the minority. But the concept must remain broad
enough to be able to meet the peculiar needs of minorities in close corporations. Is it not
therefore that the concept was developed in first instance ?
2. Advantages
Expectations is "the most reliable guide to a just solution of a dispute among
shareholders ... in the typical close corporations" 190 . The reasonable expectation standard
sprang out of the perception of peculiarities of close corporations. The advocates of
differential treatment for close corporations are the same that advocate the re standard 191 .
Reasonable expectations "grounds the discussion in the particular context of a close
corporation operating within statutory norms built for a larger enterprise". The courts
using the reasonable expectations standard are thus likely to pay attention to the specific
aspects of close corporations 192 . Because the standard is tailored for close corporations it
is adapted to many of the forms of oppression specific to close corporations. Participants
who were actively involved and are suddenly excluded will be protected. Certainly, if the
minority has invested the capital expecting full time remunerative employment or some
190 David C. Crago, Fiduciary duties and reasonable expectations cash-out mergers in close corporations,
49 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 12 n. 87 (citing, O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2)
191 With Prof. O'Neal being the most vocal proponent
192 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 712-713
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other return. But a passive investor in a close corporation will not be protected, nor mere
policy differences' 9 "1 .
The reasonable expectations standard also softens the protection of the business
judgment rule 144 . A reasonable expectations analysis preempts the business judgment rule.
The absence of bad faith requirement for reasonable expectations proves this. Bad faith is
typically used to rebut the business judgment rule presumption. Naturally, this does not
eliminate the business judgment rule protection totally form every decision but only from
those related to the alleged oppression 19 '.
Professor Thompson notes that the reasonable expectations standard "moves the
focus away from the defendants wrongdoing and towards consideration of whether the
plaintiffs rights and interests have been prejudiced,,|% . In other words it is not required to
prove fault and misconduct to obtain relief. This is again, the absence of bad faith
requirement. The influence of Hetherington's plea for elimination of the fault principle in
granting relief is obvious 197 . Plaintiffs misconduct on the other hand can provide a basis
for denial of relief. A plaintiff acting in bad faith can not invoke his expectations. Courts
can still use the fault based standard to grant relief for majority's "harsh and wrongful"
conduct. A balance must be found between the need for relief and plaintiffs wrongful
actions.
The reasonable expectation standard promotes bargaining and contract. Privately
held expectations are not considered but only, at least implicitly, communicated
193 O'NEAL'S. CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 9.29-9.30
194 Steven S. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection ofthe Appropriate Equitable Remedy.
15. J. Corp. L. 285, 322(1990)
195
Peeples supra note 1 18 at 502- n.352-503
196 Thompson's, dissolution, supra note 23 at 219
197
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 46
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substantial expectations. Without a doubt, the clearest type of communication of
expectations is to set those forth in a shareholder agreement
1
'' 8
.
The advantages of the reasonable expectations standard are thus numerous. The
standards is tailored for close corporations. It focusses on the relationships and thus
require an analysis of behavioral patterns over time and not of isolated events. Finally, it
promotes bargain and does not require any showing of bad faith 199 .
3. Disadvantages
a. Undefinedness of expectations
What the expectations of parties are is undefined. They can arise at any moment in
the relationship. Dramatizing the situation one author spoke about the "casual comment
trap"
200
. The danger is that informal comments and subjective interpretations of
comments will become binding for the majority because they are transformed into
reasonable expectations. Mere good will and generosity of the majority could have the
same effects. This in total contradiction with the principle that important decisions are
formally taken by the board or the shareholders.
Tremendous problem of proof will arise since expectations have to be disclosed but
not only in writing. Oral testimony about past conduct will be inevitable and will often
contradict corporate documents201 .
198
Hillman, supra note 136 at 78
199
Peeples supra note 1 18 at 503
200 Bruno, supra note 1 1 7 at 437
201
Peeples supra note 1 1 8 at 503
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Plaintiffs has limited expectations or they are sometimes not existent at all 20 "1 . This
is the case if the plaintiff inherited the shares or received them as gift20 '1 . He is a new
element in the venture and "has no history of expectations". Therefore in Gimpel v.
Bolstcin:
"'1
the court used the fault based test. The reasonable expectations test was not
applicable. Likewise business may have changed so much over time that it is not possible
to fulfill expectations any longer20 ". On the other hand expectations is an evolving
concept and should thus be able to cover those situations206 .
Some argue that there is a lack of mutuality. The majority does not reasonably
expect from the minority to be "devoted, remain employed, perform duties, cooperate,
vote shares or give bank guarantees'". Why then should the minority have such great
expectations?207
b. Not adapted to larger close corporations
Large close corporations are often composed of a relatively higher number of
shareholders. Such corporations have a significant influence in the community where they
are settled. This factors create expectations conflicts between the different groups of
shareholders and even between conflicting minority interests208 . Vague expectations, even
:u: Bruno, supra note 1 17 at 434 (cites following disadvantages 1) set unnecessary limits to the majority
rights 2) underestimates acceptance and understanding of the risk undertaken by the minority 3) ignores
awareness of majority that it has not unfettered power 4) negates the ability of the minority to negotiate its
own protection 5) the minority has in fact limited expectations 6) existing protection of the minority are
adequate)
203 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 712
204 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Court. 1984)
205
Bahls, supra note 194 at 327
206 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §9.30
207 Bruno, supra note 1 1 7 at 569
208
Miller, supra note 162 at 233, 254
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e. Existing protection is adequate
The argument states that minority shareholders are perfectly aware of the risk their
investment bear. They are therefore eager to use contractual agreements to protect
themselves212 . Examples of such protections are 1) provisions guaranteeing presence on
the board or veto power 2) shareholders agreement for share purchase or dividend
policy213 , (infra.VI.C. For a brief discussion of the different protections) Statutory
protection is found in the corporation act and in the securities regulations
f. Negates the agreement and eliminates risk taking for the minority
The adaptability of the reasonable expectations throughout time introduces a kind
of rebus sic stantibus clause in the agreement. Due to changed circumstances the
expectations have evolved to the extent that the minority does not have to perform
anymore. Thus they withdraw their investment. The situation also resembles the more
limited amendment "in the course of dealing". A technique adapted to contract law but
not to corporate law214 . Moreover, to the extent reasonable expectations seeks to enforce
non-written agreement it is in conflict with statutes making only such agreements in
writing enforceable21 ". Furthermore, the primary goal of corporation law, i.e.. to reduce
the transaction cost by providing a set of standard implied contract terms so that firms do
not have to restipulate these terms every time, is defeated by the reasonable expectations
212 Supra. II. and VLB. most scholars contend that for several reasons parties do not use agreements
extensively.
213 Bruno, supra note 1 17 at 566
214
Id. at 437-438
15 David C. Crago, Fiduciary duties and reasonable expectations cash-out mergers in close corporations,
49 Okla. L. RevM, 26 (1996)(citing Cal. Corp. Code. § 710 (West 1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-727
(1996))
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criterium 216 . The fact that expectations protected are also those that arise after the
purchase of the stock insulates the minority from market risks or the consequence of a
bad bargain217 . The disappointed expectations are some times due to the poor bargain of
the minority. Poor bargain should not be protected. Therefore a criterium is necessary that
distinguishes between frustration of expectations and deception resulting from poor
bargain. A proper balance must be found between reasonable expectations, legitimate
business purpose and the enforcement of the contractual relationship of the parties 2 ' 8 .
A comment on risk allocation
The risk taking argument is one of the central dilemma's of oppression. Defining
who has to bear which risk is defining which standard for oppression is adapted.
When shareholders decide to incorporate, they in fact decide to share the risks
related to the business. If things go wrong shareholders will try to withdraw without
having to bear the losses and the frustrated expectations. This is why, some argue that,
reasonable expectations eliminates the risk for the minority because they can withdraw so
easily. The answer is not that clear. Everything depends under what conditions a
shareholder is allowed to withdraw. Three principle guide this analysis: 1) No investment
is eternal even not in a (potentially eternal) corporation. 2) All parties should share the
risks equally. 3) Bad faith should not be protected. The solution in the two extremes is
evident. If the minority is eliminated because of greed of the majority they should be
protected because they have the right to share equally in the earnings of the company. On
the other hand if a shareholder in bad faith tries to withdraw from bad business he should
not be allowed to do so because he has to support, like all the others, the fact that things
216 Crago, supra note 215 at 26-27
217 Bruno, supra note 1 1 7 at 436
218
Miller, supra note 162 at 257-258
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went wrong. The problem is when a (good faith) minority shareholder is squeezed out
based on rational business decisions and legitimate business purpose. Different scenario's
can be imagined the minority shareholder is eliminated because parties can not work
together anymore or because the corporation is not able to provide a job for this
shareholder. In these scenarios we can also imagine a sub-scenario were although the
minority shareholder has lost is employment the corporation still provides him with some
return on investment by paying dividends. The risk of not being able to provide
employment (a classical expectation) must be shared by all shareholders equally and not
only by the minority. Therefore he should be able to withdraw. Moreover we cannot
accept that a shareholder remains locked-in forever. But is it not that by allowing the
minority to withdraw we force the majority to support all the risks alone, and even more
risks to the extent that they are forced to buy unwanted shares from the minority? This is
the price to pay for having minority capital. It would be unacceptable to have capital
blocked for ever. Moreover if the business is failing the minority will carry the risk of that
failure because it will receive a lower "fair price". It is important that valuation of "fair
price" includes the risk that party agree to take by joining the venture. Expectations go
very far. In our case a corporation still providing a reasonable return on investment is still
considered to frustrate the reasonable expectations of employment. Therefore the accent
should be laid on the disclosure and the acceptance of expectations. Courts should be very-
strict before accepting implied expectations.
g. The reasonable expectations standard fails to incorporate the interest of non
shareholders and an ethical consideration of "social responsibility"
This is the classical stakeholders argument. The corporation is perceived has having
social responsibilities towards employee, public health and safety, environment and in a
49
larger sense the community. Non-shareholders considered to have an interest in the
existence of the corporation are more than just the creditors. According to the
stakeholders theory, dissolution based on reasonable expectations should not be granted
as fast for instance to a corporation producing a medical device than to a corporation
whose production causes pollution219 .
h. Legitimate business purpose
The limitations to the reasonable expectations criterium guarantee that no court will
grant relief when there is bad faith of the minority220 . But what happens if the majority
has a legitimate business purpose in frustrating good faith minority shareholders
expectations ? This question refers to the tension between the business judgment rule and
reasonable expectations. Reasonable expectations eliminates the business judgment rule.
A rule whose protection remains useful (even if not adapted) in close corporations to
protect healthy business judgment221 . Recent cases acknowledge this problem by refusing
to grant relief if the minority has any fault in the non fulfillment of expectations222 . But
when expectations are frustrated without fault on either side and the majority has a
legitimate business purpose no standard is available.
219
Miller, supra note 162 at 235, 255
220
re Kemp & Beatly, Inc. 473 N.E.2d 1 173 (N.Y. 1984)
::i See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 657, 663 (1976) (recognizing "the fact that
the controlling group ... in a close corporation must have some room to maneuver in establishing the
business policy")
222
re Kemp & Beatly, Inc 473 N.E.2d 1 1 73 (N.Y. 1 984)
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4. Evaluation of the different standards for oppression
The difference between the fault based test and reasonable expectations can be
misleading. First courts do not refuse to combine the two. Second even in a reasonable
expectation test a fault based analysis plays a role because courts will analyze the equity
of the case, the fiduciary duties and the conduct of the parties 22\The two standards
overlap often because breach of fiduciary duties is not only considered as a departure
from the standard of fair dealing, but also as a conduct which frustrates reasonable
expectations224 . Yet, the standards are not similar. Fair dealing refers to "harsh dishonest
and wrongful" conduct while reasonable expectations is not fault-based 22 ".
The reasonable expectations analysis could be used as a basis for relief,
independent oppression. This approach is to broad and would jeopardize the stability of
corporations. When reasonable expectations is used as a method to define oppression
there must be a relation to action by those in control and the frustration of the
expectations of the minority. Therefore even if reasonable expectations is not fault based
it is still linked to misconduct. While the California and the North Carolina statutes with
"reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interest of the complaining
shareholder" do not require any showing of misconduct226 . Stumpfv. C.E. Stump)f & Sons.
Inc.,
22
illustrates this approach. A fired employee shareholder who did not receive any
income from the corporation anymore was granted a decree of dissolution because a
continuation of the corporation was not in his benefit or interest. But "rights and Interest"
is a to vague criterium. And for the sake of the stability of the corporation a link with
223
Miller, supra note 162 at 262
224 Thompson. Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 712
225 Thompson, Dissolution, supra note 23 at 209
226
Hillman, supra note 136 at 56
227 47 Cal. App. 3d 230 (Court. App. 1975) (even in this case an (unnecessary) reference to "fairness" was
made)
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misconduct (not fault) remains useful. "Rights and interest" is totally separate from any
course of conduct. It goes to far and is to burdensome for the majority. Decisions to grant
relief would be totally arbitrary. The link with misconduct, in the sense of frustration of
expectations is certainly necessary when those decisions are based on a legitimate
business purpose. Finally, there is a policy consideration supporting reasonable
expectations. Reasonable expectations protect the non contracting shareholder. An
approach rejected for instance by Delaware. This pro-management state insist on the
contractual liberty of parties and their bargain. We saw however that parties are often not
able to contract in the close corporate context.
Chapter IV. Expansion of Fiduciary Duties
A. A borrowed concept
The concept of fiduciary duties is a concept derived from the law of trusts228 . It is a
vague undefined concept, derived from some standards of "good behavior". Fiduciary
duties generally require "good faith and fair dealing"229 .
Directors have had since a long time fiduciary duties toward the corporation and the
shareholders230 . A duty of fairness owed by the majority or controlling group to the
minority has also been recognized2jl . This duty, even though recognized, has not gained
wide acceptance in the beginning232 . Recently, courts have changed their attitude and
recognized a duty of the majority, especially in small close corporations. In that context
the courts have heightened the traditional standard of duty owed.
228 Henry F. Johnson, Strict Fiduciary Duties in Close Corporation: A Concept in Search ofAdoption, 18
Cal. Western L. Rev. 1, 3 (1981) ("A trust is a relation of total custody, effected by appropriation of an
asset, giving rise to duties directed to the benefit of the beneficiary")
229 HENN, supra note 19 at 627 ("fiduciary duties and their correlative rights are an abstraction unless
defined in terms of their persons of inherence and of incidence, their subject matter, and the acts of
forbearances they require")
230 Johnson supra note 228 at 2
231 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); See O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at
§7:17 n. 13 (for a discussion of all the cases where a duty form the controlling group towards the minority
has been found)
232 But See as a general rule shareholders do not owe each other or to the corporation any duty, P. A.
Agabin, Annotation, Duty and liability ofclosely held corporation, its directors, officers, or majority
stockholders, in acquiring stock ofminority shareholder, 1 A.L.R. 3d 500 n. 5 (suppl. 1996); Thomas J.
Bamonte, Expanding thefiduciary duties ofclose corporation shareholders: the dilemmafacing Illinois
corporate law, 15 N. 111. U. L. Rev. 257 (1995); See also generally for a description of the early evolution
of the concept of fiduciary duty, Rodman Elfin, A critique ofthe proposed statutory close corporation
supplement to the model business corporation act, 8 J. Corp L. 439, 454-456 (1983)
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This expansion of fiduciary duties is in first instance supported by the partnership
analog)^233 . Proponents of the analogy note that the characteristics and especially the
relationships in partnerships are identical to those in close corporations. Therefore
principles of partnerships, like heightened standards of fiduciary duties, should apply in
close corporations (Supra II. B. 2.). Through this approach courts can guarantee an "equal
treatment" for frozen out minority shareholders 2"4 . The corporation is on its turn also
protected against an errant shareholder^.
Heightened partner-like fiduciary duties limit the right of control of the majority
and the protection of the business judgment rule236 . The duty of care in close corporations
is more than the mere process duty it is in a public corporation237 . The substance of the
business decision is weighted against a concept of fairness and loyalty whenever the
minority is harmed. However, to the extent courts accept a showing of legitimate business
purpose they try to compromise between the two concepts. 238 This showing allows the
controlling group to withhold some room to maneuver in establishing business policies239 .
Finally we note that from the beginning there has been a (rather academic)
discussion concerning the nature of the action for breach of fiduciary duty: contract or
233 Crago, supra note 2 1 5 at 7-8
234 Bamonte. supra note 232 at 259
235 Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981 )(a minority shareholder was
held to have breached its fiduciary duty when he exercised a veto power in a way that did not take into
account the reasonable expectations of the majority); Bamonte, supra note 232 at 260; O'NEAL'S,
OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §7:17 (a duty is certainly imposed -upon the minority if the minority has
received veto powers)
6 HENN, supra note 19 at 628 ("Breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation precludes application of the
business judgment rule")
J?
But see Justis, supra note 15 at 264 (but public corporations with some characteristics of close
corporations maybe held to have the same fiduciary duties)
238
Ivery D. Foreman, Re-defining Close Corporations, 78 -MAR A.B.A. J. 76 (1992)
239 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E. 2d 657 (1976)
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tort?
240
In the contract approach the minority is able to waive contractually the fiduciary
duties owed by the majority. 241
B. An enhanced standard in close corporations
In the landmark decision, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 2 '12 the court decided
that the special relationships and needs of close corporations24 " motivated that an
enhanced standard of fiduciary duty is applied on them. The same strict standard of
"utmost good faith and loyalty" that is used in partnerships. Thus, the court decided that
the minority shareholder should get an "equal opportunity" to sell her shares to the
majority as a former director received.
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.
,
244 the Massachusetts court extended the
application of the Donahue strict standard of fiduciary duties from a share purchase
situation to the freeze out context. The employment of the minority shareholder had been
terminated by the majority in disrespect of an understanding that the four shareholders
would elect each other as directors and would actively participate in the management.
Wilkes was excluded from any company income. Donahue was tempered in that the court
in Wilkes allowed the showing of a legitimate business purpose. Purpose that must on its
turn be balanced against less harmful alternatives. Thus fiduciary duties are limited by
40 See generally, Andrew P. Campbell, Litigating Minority Shareholder Rights and the New Tort of
Oppression, 53 Ala. L. 108 (1992); Michael E. De Bow, Oppression ofMinority Shareholders: Contract
not tort, 54 Ala. L. 128(1993)
241 De Bow supra note 240 at 1 30
242 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
243 See supra at II. A. for a definition of close corporations by the Donahue court.
244 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E. 2d 657 (1976)
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evaluation of intent and wrongdoing of the majority in terms of specifie harm to the
minority245 .
In Orchard v. Covelli 246 the court used the stringent standard of "utmost good faith
and loyalty" and added that any "squeeze out" attempt through self dealing would
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover the majority has to be "intrinsically fair"
to the minority when it seeks a controlling share. A standard different from Donahue and
Wilkes? Presumably not so different as to the results247 . The duty of this standard is
phrased as one not to exclude shareholders from meaningful participation248 .
Other states also imposed strict fiduciary duties on shareholders249 . In Hagshenas v.
Gaylord2M) the Illinois court finally adopted the strict standard of fiduciary duty. This
decision was reached after the court addressed the partnership analogy251 . A similar
decision was taken by the Ohio Supreme Court in Crosby v. Beam232 where the
heightened standard of fiduciary duties was breached because benefit from advantages
where not made equally available to the minority. Like in Wilkes the majority carried the
burden of proof of legitimate business purpose. The decision has introduced a new
exception to the employment at will doctrine253 . Note that a New York court held that no
245
Kathleen L. Kuhlman, Comment, Beyond Crosby v. Beam: Ohio courts extendprotection ofminority
stockholders ofclose corporations, 27 Akron L. Rev. 477, 480 (1994) (for instance, has a personal
advantage not been made equally available to the minority)
246 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W. D. Penn. 1984), aff d, 802 F. 2d 448 (3rd Cir. 1986)
247
L. Clark Hicks, Corporation — Fiduciary duty — in a close corporation, a majority shareholder owes a
fiduciary duty towards a minority when seeking a controlling share, 60 Miss. L. J. 425, 438 ( 1 990)
248 Thompson, Shareholder s Cause, supra note 24 at 728
249
Hicks, supra note 247 at 427 n. 55 (Citing jurisdiction who follow the strict standard of fiduciary duty in
close corporations)
250 557 N.E.2d 316 (111. App. Ct. 1990)
251 The court stated that Hagshenas owed a duty "similar to a partner" to the corporation and its
shareholders
252 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989)
5
" Kathleen L. Kuhlman, Comment, Beyond Crosby v. Beam: Ohio courts extend protection ofminority
stockholders ofclose corporations, 27 Akron L. Rev. 477, 499 (1994)
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fiduciary duty precluded termination of employment 254 . Shareholders employment and
fiduciary duties remains a heavy litigated issue" 55 .
Some states refuse the strict fiduciary duties standard. In Ziddel v. Ziddel2ib the
intrusive approach into business judgment of Wilkes was rejected in favor of deference to
the business judgment rule. The same respect for business judgment guided the decision
in Johns v. Caldwell23 . The court refused the partnership analogy argument and did not
prevent a 10% shareholder to sell his shares to a 45% shareholder. This courts refused to
apply the Donahue standard or to find an equal opportunity in the right to sell258 .
Delaware, as pro-management state rejected expansion of fiduciary duties in close
corporations259 . Delaware is in general very cautious with oppression remedies so as to
attract corporations. The decision where to incorporate is presumably made by the
majority shareholders. Moreover, Delaware has well developed standards of fiduciary
duties for public corporations, by refusing to apply stricter standards in close corporations
it preserves its competitive advantage and its body of case law260 .
Even if there are differences of interpretation of the scope and meaning of the
Donahue fiduciary duty standard, it can be stated that the standard has gained widespread
acceptance261 . In North Dakota and Minnesota the statutes expressly mention the
heightened standard of fiduciary duties for close corporations 262 . It has also been
254 Gallagher v. Lampert, 549 N.E. 2d 136 (N.Y. 1989)
25<; Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 729
256 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977)
257 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)
258
Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2D 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Commoli v. Commoli, 246 S.E. 2d
278 (Ga 1978) (verifier citation court); Miller v. Magline, 256 N.W.2D 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
259 Nixon, v. Blackwell, 626 A. 2d 1366 (Del. 1993)
260 Bamonte, supra note 232 at 266
261 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 729
262 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751(3) (a): N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-1 15(3)
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suggested to add an express provision in the close corporations supplement 2*". The
enhanced duty, however, is limited by three principles: 1 ) the corporation must be a close
corporation 2) the relationship between shareholders must be that of partners 3) no
legitimate business purpose explains the decision264 .
C. Fiduciary duties, oppression and reasonable expectations: parallel, intermingled or
distinct ?
Oppression defined as reasonable expectations and heightened fiduciary duty have
in common the willingness of courts to help squeezed out minority shareholders265 . This
is proven by the fact that fiduciary duties have often been extended faster in states who do
not have an "oppression statute" or a dissolution remedy266 . A way for these courts to
grant some protections to minority shareholders in a statutory difficult environment.
Therefore it might be argued that the interpretation of fiduciary duties in states without
oppression statutes is not applicable in those having one267 . Both cause of action
developed in parallel.
The "reasonable expectations" standard has also been used to determine breach of
fiduciary duty268 . Thus some courts use the same standard to determine "oppression" in a
b3 Richard A. Mann., A critical analysis ofthe statutory close corporation supplement to the model
business corporation act, 22 Am. Bus. L. J. 289, 336 (1983) (the suggested section states" Shareholders of
a statutory close corporation shall be deemed to stand in fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to its
shareholders"); Rodman Elfin, A critique ofthe proposed statutory close corporation supplement to the
model business corporation act, 8 J. Corp L. 439, 454 (1983)
264 Murdock, supra note 31 at 436
265 Bamonte, supra note 232 at 260
266 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 700
267 Bamonte, supra note 232 at 266 n. 50
268 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §9.30 (suppl. 1996)
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dissolution or alternative remedy case as in a breach of fiduciary duty case269 . The
advantage of "reasonable expectations'" as the standard for breach of fiduciary duties is
that it helps to determine the otherwise vague duties owed by the majority270 . Here the
parallelism of both action is broken. The scope of facts they cover is identical.
In other jurisdictions breach of fiduciary duty is independent and not related to the
reasonable expectation standard. Breach of fiduciary duty is then defined as a departure
from some standards of good faith and loyalty. Even when the two standards coexist
separately, breach of fiduciary duty often also amounts to a frustration of reasonable
expectations271 . Therefore a combined cause of action for oppression is possible based on
the same facts. An action for breach of duty and one to request dissolution or the
application of an alternative remedy based on statutory "oppression"272 . The differences
between the two actions must be kept in mind when choosing the appropriate approach.
As we said the development of the two avenue for relief have been different in states
depending on their availability. Some states have no statutory cause of action for
oppression and tend to have broad fiduciary obligations. While in other states the direct
common law remedies have not been well developed because of the oppression
statutes
273
. The availability of remedies also plays a great role in the procedural choice. It
makes no sense to request dissolution when a corporation is financially broke while an
order compelling a shareholder to deliver something he had agreed to might save the
corporation. Remedies available under the two causes of action are not identical. In
breach of fiduciary action courts retain equitable powers. Powers that are more restricted
in the statutory context. Although neither the courts nor the scholars agree to what extent.
269 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 700
270
Darryl Kates, Case note. Derivative v. Individual actions in a close corporate context: Crosby v. Beam,
59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 643, 657 ( 1990)
271 Thompson, Shareholder s Cause, supra note 24 at 7 1
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The breach of duty cause of action will be more used in an ongoing relationship for
recovery while an action for recovery based on dissolution and buy out is obviously
meant to terminate the relationship274 .
D. Necessity of a heightened standard?
The acceptance of heightened fiduciary duties relies heavily on the partnership
analogy. An analogy whose accuracy can be doubted. Some weaknesses of the analogy
have already been discussed above (Supra. II. B. 2.). Other arguments strengthen this
critique. Closely knit relationships of partnerships are not always present in close
corporation with great numbers of shareholders. Close corporations are sometimes
composed of an impressive number of participants275 . Moreover, because of the limited
liability protection in corporation the same mutual cooperation is not required
automatically as it is the case in partnerships where a partner can bind the whole
partnership276 .
Like for the reasonable expectations standard opponents of expanded fiduciary
duties point out that shareholders have enough possibilities to protect themselves through
private contracting 277 . Easterbrook and Fischel disagree with the proposition that
differences between close- and public corporation induce automatically the necessity of
different level of scrutiny. Managers in close corporation bear more the costs of their
decisions and the low number of shareholders facilitate contractual agreements. This
features seem to suggest that greater scrutiny is needed in public corporations. Therefore
274 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 730
275 Kates supra note 270 at 659-660 (citing, Hillman, supra note 136 at 61-68)
276
Id.
277 EASTERBROOK'S, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 5 at 234-236
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they suggest to use in both corporation the same standard of review but to apply them
differently because of structural differences of organization. Hence, a termination of
employment in a close corporation will be evaluated with more scrutiny by courts because
it can have terrible consequences in that context. They do not plead for different standard
of fiduciary duty but for a differentiated application of the business judgment rule278 . A
semantic difference?
Easterbrook and Fischel also critisized the idea that one aspect of fiducairy duties is
that shareholders have to be treated equally. The "equal oportunity" standard developed
by the Donahue court is irealistic. How could all shareholders receive an equal salary,
share or position. Not surprisingly, was the standard restricted in Wilkes279 .
The expansion of the standard is an attempt of courts in a often legal difficult
context to protect minorities. The problem is that the fiduciary standards are vague and
even more undefined than reasonable expectations. The partnership analogy although
interesting is not accurate. Fiduciary duty is a cause of uncertainty. Therefore the better
addapted reasonable expectation and oppression cause of action should be preffered. A
standard that is broad enough and does not need to be completed. Certainly, if the broad
range of alternative equitable reliefs available with a fiduciary duty action are also in a
classical oppression action.
E. Equitable remedies in fiduciary duty actions
The recognition of a stricter standard of fiduciary duty by the Donahue court is
linked with the lack of relief available at that time in close corporations. The court
278
Id. at 243-245
279
Id. at 247
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conceived direct action as a "rescue operation" for minority shareholders. The Donahue-
case opened the way for courts to fashion equitable reliefs280 . The forms of relief available
will depend on the type of harm suffered281 . Difference in availability of relief will often
determine the course of action of the parties: breach of fiduciary duties or statutory
"oppression". The importance of the heightened standard of fiduciary' duty, thus lays
principally in the many equitable reliefs it made available.
F. Direct actions for derivative harm
In a derivative proceeding the plaintiff sues in the name of corporation, while in a
direct action he files suit on his own behalf282 . Because a derivative suit is an exceptional
procedure in that it allows a shareholder to speak for the corporation and not the board,
many procedural hurdles have to be overcome. The lack of independent directors in close
corporations, however, diminishes those hurdles.
The implications of a derivative procedure are obvious. Damages and compensation
will go to the corporation, who is controlled by the majority. In minority oppression cases
derivative action makes little sense. Derivative litigation is used when the shareholder is
harmed only indirectly by a reduction of the value of his shares. Most breach of fiduciary
duty litigation are brought by shareholders derivatively. Like claims for mismanagement,
negligence and misappropriation28^
Thomas P. Billings, Remedies for the aggrieved shareholder in a close corporation. 81 Mass. L. Rev. 3,
5(1996)
281 Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 661 (1988) (The court "exercising its traditional equity powers"
will try to put "the innocent partner ... as nearly as possible in the same position which he would have
occupied if there have been no wrongdoing")
28: HENN, supra note 19 at 1044-1046 (for a general discussion of direct and derivative action)
283 Kates supra note 270 at 661
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Direct action is theoretically only authorized when the harm to the shareholder is
separate and distinct from injury to the corporations 284 . This concern mostly claims based
on "rights^. However, in a close corporation injury to the corporation may have a clear
and discernable impact on an individual shareholder, because shareholders are few and
the financial affairs of the corporation are relatively uncomplicated285 . This is why,
although, generally a shareholder seeking to recover for breach of fiduciary duty by a
controlling shareholder must bring a derivative action, courts have recently been willing
to accept direct actions from individually harmed minority shareholders286 .
In Crosby v. Beam2S a breach of fiduciary duty towards the minority shareholders
gave a right of direct action. The partnership analogy developed in Donahue was fully
embraced by the court to motivate its decision. The court recognized that a claim for
misappropriation of corporate funds is traditionally a derivative claim since the
shareholders is only harmed indirectly but that the special characteristics of close
corporation and the direct fiduciary duties of the majority motivated a derogation. The
dissent pointed out that the right to sue directly was to broadly formulated and should
have been limited to squeeze out situation288 .
The recognition of the rights of direct action are also partially rooted in the
partnership analogy. A partner (thus also a shareholder in a close corporation) harmed by
another partner/shareholder can sue directly. However, this vision ignores that, unlike a
partnership, a corporation is a separate legal entity capable to sue, and thus harm to the
corporation must be brought derivatively289 . This argument on its turn is weakened by the
284
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285
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286
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63
consideration that the recognition of a duty from the majority to the minority in a
corporation supports direct action290 .
Thus a growing number of courts accept direct action in close corporation when
those actions in a public corporation setting should have been brought derivatively. The
disproportionate impact that the majority decision has in close corporations motivates this
approach. In fact courts accept nowadays "an individual cause of action for
oppression"291 . The American Law Institute's principles of corporate governance support
direct action, be it in the limited situation where this does not harm other shareholders
and creditors292 . Delaware, not surprisingly, refused to recognize a direct cause of action
for oppression29^.
Nonetheless, many policy reasons favor the use of derivative actions. Reasons that
should be weighted before adhering to the clearer direct litigation procedure. The
corporation is a separate entity. A minority direct action permits the minority to ignore the
separate legal entity at the moment the entity collects return on investment while the rest
of the time the minority benefited from this legal personality. Moreover, direct action
harms creditors. They are forced to support risks greater than what they had bargained for.
Fellow shareholders may also be deprived from equal benefits of the recovery. Finally,
direct action diminishes the possibility that stakeholder interests and societal
considerations will be taken into account294 .
Therefore a narrower standard to define when direct litigation is permitted has been
suggested. The "realistic objectives" standard allows in "exceptional situations" the use
290 Steelman v. Mallory. 716 P.2d 1282 (Idaho 1986)
291 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 736
92 American Law Institute, Principles ofCorporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §7.0 1(d)
(1994)
" Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990) (federal court applying Delaware
law)
294 Kates supra note 270 at 66 1 -663
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of direct litigation. Broadly, "realistic objectives" will not be fulfilled if the majority
shareholder/wrongdoer will benefit from the corporate recovery. This criteria, on its turn,
has been replaced by a narrower allowing direct action if interested parties such as
creditors other directors and shareholders, are not prejudiced295 .
The policy considerations described above are certainly legitimate. However, in a
situation where a derivative procedure does not allow to threaten the scheme of
oppression of the majority, the action is meaningless. In such case direct action is
indispensable. Naturally, alternative pleading of direct and derivative action is possible.
In a situation where defendant breached duties to the corporation and to the shareholders
both action can be successfully combined296 .
295
Id. at 663-665
296
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Chapter V. Judicial dissolution
A. Grounds for dissolution
1. kinds of dissolution
Three different kinds of dissolution are defined in corporate statutes:
1) Voluntary dissolution . All states provide for voluntary dissolution. Usually
proposed by the board and approved by a majority or two thirds of shareholders297 . Thus
the majority has power, like a partner, to dissolve the corporation at will. A right the
minority does not have248 . Voluntary dissolution can be used by the majority to squeeze
out minority shareholders. Usually in that case a company controlled by the majority will
buy the liquidated assets299 . Abuse by the majority of voluntary dissolution to squeeze out
minority can constitute breach of fiduciary duty" 00 . Voluntary dissolution questions the
permanence of corporation, however in a way consistent with the majority rule. A
unanimity vote requirement has been proposed for involuntary dissolution in close
corporations. Unanimity would have terrible consequences. Any shareholder could veto
dissolution. This requirement does not really preserve the corporate community contrary
297 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.02
298 Thompson, dissolution, supra note 23 at 200
299 O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §5:21
300 Thompson, dissolution, supra note 23 at 200-201 ; O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2
at § 9.27
65
66
to what is suggested by its proponents. A little bit like divorce laws requiring unanimous
consent do not preserve marriagesj01 .
2) Administrative dissolution by the secretary of state for unpaid due taxes and
other essential corporate formalities302 .
3) Finally, court ordered dissolution
2. Statutory grounds for judicial dissolution
The MBCA provides that the Attorney General, a shareholder or a creditor can
request judicial dissolution each on different groundsj0j . Nowadays, every state has a
dissolution provision. All but six states allow a shareholder to bring an action for judicial
dissolution. Delaware, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Puerto Rico do not provide for
shareholder action. However, in these states dissolution proceedings may be brought by
the attorney general '"upon his own motion or upon the relation of a proper party"304 . The
Illinois act of 1933 allowing shareholder to petition for dissolution served as a model for
other corporation acts305 .
The first dissolution statute were limited to situation involving the occurrence of a
threat of irreparable injury. Nowadays the grounds have been broadened to include
deadlock, illegality, fraud, or waste306 . The MBCA permits shareholder action if the
directors are deadlocked in management or the shareholders are deadlocked in voting
301
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304
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powers. In case of "illegal oppressive or fraudulent conduct" by the "directors or those in
control of the corporation" similar action is possible. Finally, judicial dissolution can be
requested when corporate assets are "misapplied or wasted"307 . The close corporation
"supplement" provides the same ground for dissolution as the MBCA 308 . Additionally the
"supplement" provides that dissolution can be granted "if all other relief ordered by the
court under section 41 (the laundry list of ordinary reliefs) or 42 (the buy-out remedy) has
failed to resolve the matters in dispute"309 . The judge retains discretionary power. He
"may" dissolve the corporation^ 10 .
In any case dissolution must be considered "appropriate as a last resort after other
possibilities of resolving the dispute have failed" 1 ". This negative tone of comment is
regrettable. It slows down efforts to make dissolution more acceptable to courts312 .
Nevertheless, the MBCA and the "supplement" can in general be considered as
promoting reliefs including dissolution. This goal is achieved with provisions providing
broader grounds for reliefs compared with the timidity of other statutes and also the
provisions providing a flexible list of alternative remedies. The broadening of dissolution
grounds evolved in parallel with the acceptance of alternative remedies313 . Some states
like for instance, North Carolina consciously eliminated the available alternative
remedies from their statutes thereby increasing courts reluctance to order dissolution" 14 .
i01Id at§ 14.30(2)
308 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 43(a)(1)
309 Id at § 43(a)(2)
310 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30 (official comment) (emphasizing the discretionary power of the court)
311 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 40 (official comment, 1. Introduction); Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. §
43(a)(2)
3,2
Bradley, supra note 80 at 836, 840
313
O'Neill, supra note 17 at 694
3l4See generally, Robert Savage McLean, Minority shareholders rights in the close corporation under the
new North Carolina business corporation act, 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1 109, 1 120-1 125 (1990) (discussing the
elimination of alternative reliefs and the influence on the use of dissolution)
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The first ground for dissolution in a proceeding by a shareholder is deadlock.
Deadlock315 (on which this thesis does not focus) is by definition a dead end situation. In
that case a definitive solution is badly needed. The corporation will otherwise turn into a
deadweight for the shareholders and the economy. Therefore deadlock developed as the
first and most important ground for dissolution' 16 . Deadlock can be defined as "corporate
paralysis of such a magnitude that the corporation simply cannot function, and is in
danger of imminent financial disaster"' 17 . Cases have broadened interpretation of the term
such as to include deadlocks due to super-majority votes and not only due to 50%/50%
splits. Showing of irreparable injury is usually required for a management deadlock but
not for a shareholders deadlock318 .
Grounds for dissolution like "waste and misapplication of assets"' are most of the
time combined by courts with "illegality and fraud". The situation covered by those
grounds are excessive salaries, payment of personal debts and other situations involving
self-dealing' 19 .
Finally, oppression is the ground for dissolution we focus on. Only a dozen states
have not included oppression as a ground for dissolution320 . (See supra. III. for a
15 See generally, Stuart L. Pachman, Corporation evenly divided: judicial remediesfor equal shareholders,
24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 234 (1993) (for a discussion focussing on the problems of deadlock, with emphasis
on the buy out remedy)
316 Harry J. Haynsworth, The effectiveness ofinvoluntary dissolution suits as a remedyfor close
corporation dissension, 35.1 Clev. St. L. Rev. 25, 33 (1987); Linda L. Shapiro, Involuntary dissolution of
close corporations for mistreatment ofminority shareholders, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 1119, 1 130 (1983); See
also Israels, Sacred cow, supra note 18 (discussing the early reluctance of courts to even grant dissolution
for deadlock")
317 Id at 31
318 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30 (2)
319 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 35
:o Hunter J. Brownlee, Comment , The shareholders agreement: a contractual alternative to oppression as
a groundfor dissolution, 24 Stetson L. Rev. 267, 272 (1994) "(thirteen states do not authorize dissolution
for oppression, unfair behavior or the protection of minority shareholders. Among this group of thirteen, six
jurisdiction allow dissolution only when shareholders or directors are deadlocked in the management of
their corporation. Four states permit dissolution for illegal and fraudulent conduct. Lastly, three states, most
notably Delaware, do not allow minority shareholders to dissolve for any reason"); Thompson,
Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 709 n. 70 (for a list of those states)
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discussion of "oppression" as a cause of action for dissolution). The official comment
warns that the "abuse of power"j21 provisions should be used with caution "so as to limit
them to genuine abuse rather than instances of acceptable tactics in a power struggle for
control of a corporation"322 .
Connecticut uses the broadest terms, permitting relief for "any good and sufficient
reason"
j2j
.
The grounds for dissolution are since a few years broad enough. This is especially
due to the development of a broader interpretation of the "oppression" ground. Rest to see
if courts are willing to respect and use the statutes.
3. Equity grounds
Courts have slowly recognized that there is an equity ground for shareholders
dissolution action324 .Till the end of the 19th century shareholder dissension was legally
ignored. Since incorporation was a rare privilege and legislature created corporation,
judicial reluctance to dissolve was comprehensible. But English courts recognized in an
early stage their power to fashion equitable relief in shareholder suits so as to allow
"complete relief325 . Thus equity legitimated a wide variety of reliefs. The Michigan
Supreme Court was the first to dissolve a corporation in the case of Miner v. Belle Isle Ice
Co.,
326
so as to grant "complete relief. In this first case the ground for dissolution was
fraud.
321
I.e., acting "illegally, oppressively, or fraudulently" (section 14.30(2)(ii» and corporate assets being
"misapplied or wasted" (section 14.30(2)(iv)).
322 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30 (official comment 2. b.)
323 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-382
324 See also Israels, Sacred cow, supra note 18 at 781 ("courts of many states have held they have no power
- absent statute- to dissolve")
325
Hitchens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1828)
326 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 2 1 8 ( 1 892)
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The Supreme Court of Florida for instance in Mills Development Corp. v. Shipp &
Head Inc., 327 recognized her equity power to wind up a corporation if the corporate assets
are in danger of being mismanaged or lost due to the " mismanagement, collusion or
fraud'* of controlling shareholders. In this early case, the court stated that dissolution
would only be ordered if the corporation has ceased conducting most of its business or is
unable to function. The same court in MacAllister Hotel Inc. v. Schatzber^:s adopted
later on a two prong test to dissolve a corporation in equity. In a first step they applied a
variation of the mismanagement and fraud test of Mills. The second prong evaluated the
solvency of the offending shareholder. Absent fraud a corporation will only be dissolved
for egregious misconduct if the shareholder is insolvent. Florida courts have generally
refused to dissolve corporations for freeze outs329 . In Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 2j0 the
court was willing to order dissolution because the managers run the company for their
own benefit. Other courts like for instance. New York courts, are very reluctant to order
dissolution and usually require wrongful intent53 '.
Dissolution statutes where in fact enacted to make an end to the reluctancy of courts
to use the dissolution remedy in dramatic situations332 . Therefore it is erroneous to deduct
that statutory grounds and remedies limit the equity powers of the courts 333 . Most courts
have acknowledged this but some with New York in the lead consider their powers to be
limited by the reliefs listed in the statute. 33
"4 Another uncertainty is created by the broader
327
171 So. 533 (Fla. 1936), cert, denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1938)
328 40 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1949)
32<) Keck v. Schumacher, 198 So.2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 204 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1967);
Brownlee, supra note 320 at 283 (see also.generally for a discussion of the cases in Florida)
330 297F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
331
Leibertv. Clapp, 13N.Y.2d313, 196-N.E..2d 540 (1963)
332 O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §7:21
333
Bahls, supra note 1 94 at 3 1 3-3 1
5
334
E.g. re Field, Rich & Associates, 134 Misc. 2d 216, 217, 510 N.Y.S.2d 47. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); See
also for instance, Robert Savage McLean, Minority- sharholders rights in the close corporation under the
new North Carolina business corporation act, 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1 109, 1 122-1 123 (1990) ("Despite the clear
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remedies (and sometimes grounds) provided in close corporations statutes. Those
remedies (and grounds) are not provided in the general corporate law. The "supplement"
explicitly states that "This Supplement does not repeal or modify any satute or rule of law
that is or would apply to corporation organized under the [Model] Business Corporation
Act . . . and that does not elect to become a statutory close corporation . . ."3 !5 Even if
other close corporation statutes do not explicitly include such negative implication the
same rule applies336 .
Courts of equity basically recognized the necessity to grant dissolution in two types
of situations 1) the corporation could not be operated any more (obviously, deadlock is
aimed at here) 2) oppression337 . In fact the equitable grounds for dissolution are not really
important since courts rarely order dissolution in equity 338 . The enactment of dissolution
provision has made a discussion of equity dissolution obsolete. What is important in
reality is the willingness of court to order statutory judicial dissolution.
B. Courts fading reluctancy to order (statutory) dissolution
When do courts order dissolution and which facts lead to such decision can only be
inferred from a casuistic study. Dissolution cases have lead to different statistical studies
(see infra. V.C.3.). We cite some of the more recent cases.
legislative intent behind the elimination of section 55.125.1 (North Carolina statute), it can be argued that
North Carolina courts might retain some power to provide for alternative relief to dissolution based on the
courts inherent equitable powers")
335 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 3(a)
336
Bahls, supra note 1 94 at 3 1
5
337
Bahls, supra note 194 at 295
338
Shapiro, supra note 316 at 1 126
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Re Kemp & Deatly, Inc. 339 , is a dissolution with alternative buy out case. As
previously mentioned it is one of the leading "oppression cases". Denial of return of
investment was found to be "oppressive" enough to justify dissolution. Lowder v. All Star
Mills, Inc.
340
is a case where the court used the reasonable expectations standard to grant
dissolution. The court considered that dissolution was the only way to fulfill the
reasonable expectations of the minority. In Matter ofSchwen341 the court introduced a two
part test to grant dissolution. First the showing of oppressive conduct. Second dissolution
must be the only feasible measure of fairly compensating the minority shareholder.
Dissolution was denied. In re Harris3
'12
the court also considered dissolution as a last
resort solution to provide to the shareholder a fair return on his investment. The court
added that liquidation must be reasonably necessary to protect interest of most of the
shareholders. Dissolution would be denied if a fair return could be guaranteed by a forced
buy out. Giannoti v. Hamway343 is also one of these leading oppression case in which the
court found dissolution legitimate because the majority failed to pay adequate dividends
and engaged in a freeze out scheme of conduct. In Ropper v. Dynamique Concepts, Inc. 344
the court confirmed that a good faith justification for corporate actions will overcome
oppression. Dissolution was denied.
Even though dissolution is available in most states for closely as well as publicly
held corporation. Judicial dissolution is in reality only available to close corporations.
Courts almost never dissolve public corporations345 .
"9 473N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984)
340 75 N.C. App. 233, 330 S.E.2d 649 (1985)
341 199 N. L.Y.J. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1988)
34: 500N.Y.S.2d5(1986)
343 387 S.E.2D 725 (Va. 1990).
344 447 S.E.2d 2 1 8 (Ct. App. 1 994)
345 O'NEAL'S. CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §1.16
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Courts general reluctancy to order dissolution (in close corporations) leads to
legally weak results. Some courts have held that oppressive conduct occurred and
nevertheless refused to grant statutory dissolution
346
. Others needed accumulation of
oppressive acts to warrant dissolution 347 .
Dissolution seems to have been ordered by courts for the same grounds as
dissolution based on equity: 1) deadlock 2) egregious conduct by dominant group^48 . But
even courts using the reasonable expectation standard appear to work on a cases by case
basis to determine if the conduct complained is egregious enough and unfair to warrant
relief
349
. So despite the development of standards, decisions are still taken on a case by
case basis. Other dissolution cases had for grounds "wilfully unfair" and "unfairly
prejudicial" conduct or "abuse of authority"350 . On the other hand courts are unwilling to
grant relief (not only dissolution) for mere policy disagreement not resulting in deadlock
or transitory grievance35 '. Court were reluctant to order dissolution. They still are but
slowly the attitude is changing. In recent years court have ordered more dissolutions352 .
Courts still seem to be more hesitant to grant dissolution when the firm is profitable even
when the majority allocates the profits to themselves353 . The McAllister case mentioned
above speaks for himself.
The parallel evolution of the broadening of the interpretation of "oppression", the
acceptance of dissolution and the creation of alternative remedies brought courts to justify
346
Shapiro, supra note 3 1 6 at 1 1 37 (Citing Alaska Plastics Inc. v. Coppock, 62 1 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1 980))
347
Id. (Citing Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976))
348 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 56
349 Joshua M. Henderson, Buy out Remedyfor oppressed minority shareholders, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 195, 201
(1995)
350
Shapiro, supra note 3 16 at 1 144-1 146
351 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 75, 86
52 Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, What amounts to "oppressive" conduct under statute authorizing
dissolution ofcorporation at suit ofminority stockholders, 56 A.L.R. 3d 358 (Suppl. 1996) (for a
discussion of all recent cases where dissolution was granted or denied)
353
O'Neill supra note 17 at 646
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dissolution only for severely oppressive conduct while for less oppressive conduct, less
drastic (alternative) remedies are required'' 54 . For the minority shareholder what matters
is, that if needed, in last resort, dissolution will be granted. There is a way out of the close
corporation, although it is costly and time consuming.
C. Evaluation of the dissolution remedy
1 . Arguments in favor
Dissolution has many advantages. The shareholder is allowed to recover his
investment when he is frozen-out. No investment is perpetual. The threat of dissolution
has a preventive aspect. It deters oppressive conduct from the majority355 . Dissolution is
also needed because "the little people" of close corporation do not contract adequately.
The law must provide a way out although the same, if not better, results could be obtained
through private contracting. In a sense the law plays the role of "consumer protection" for
unsophisticated investors. Furthermore the risks of abuse are benign. Minority
shareholders rarely use the remedy just to withdraw their capital without sufficient
reasons. Judges are cautious not to interfere in mere corporate policy disputes356 . But
some commentators are still not reassured. They point out that most dissolution statute do
not request possession of a minimum amount of shares to sue. A shareholder owning one
354 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 427
55 Brownlee, supra note 320 at 283 (citing Marilyn B. Cane, Oppressive Conduct: Should it be groundsfor
judicial dissolution:1
.
The Q. Rep. (The Fla. Bar Business Law Section, Tallahassee, Fla.), Dec. 1993. at
20-21 ) but the author himself does not believe dissolution has a preventive effect, at 269; O'NEAL'S,
OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §10:09
156 Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 715
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share can theoretically petition for dissolution''
7
. The majority could also abuse the
remedy by threatening the minority with a dissolution to force a buy-outj58 . It is doubtful
that courts will be mislead in such eventuality. However it cannot be denied that the
remedy tips/ redresses the balance of power to minority shareholders359 . The majority,
faced with potential adverse consequences of dissolution, like for instance fiscal
consequences, can feel compelled to settle with the plaintiff on terms that are objectively
too favorable for the minority 360 .
Partners can dissolve and withdraw from partnerships at will. The promoters of the
dissolution remedy in corporation draw the parallel. The legal framework, however is
different. In a partnership, the withdrawing partner is liable for the damages caused by its
action361 . A withdrawing partners ("only") risk is that he will loose his interest in the
name of the goodwill of the business and based on this be liable for damages inflicted362 .
The partnership analogy has been invoked to promote dissolution at will of close
corporations ,6j . When dissolution at will is available then the business judgment rule can
be applied fully without risks of oppression. Dissolution at will can be highly abused and
lead to strategic withdrawal. For instance excluding co-ventures with a buy back
operation when the prospects of business rentability are improving. On the other hand
dissolution at will deters absolutely oppressive behavior and induces cooperation^64 .
However this would totally destroy the stability and relative permanence of close
357 Brownlee, supra note 320 at 291
358 Mat 291
59
Bahls, supra note 194 at 296; Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 40 (official comment, acknowledging
that the remedy gives much power to the minority)
360 Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 90
361 Shapiro
,
supra 316 note at 1 121-1222
362
Israels, Sacred cow, supra note 18 at 789
363
O'Neill supra note 17 at 690
364
Id. at 702
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corporations, one of the important features of corporations. Corporations are not
partnerships.
2. Arguments tending to be in disfavor of the dissolution remedy
An old fashioned argument against dissolution states that courts should not dissolve
legislative creations. In fact this dates back to the early reluctancy of courts to grant
dissolution in equity because the sovereign act of the state (king or legislature) created the
corporation and this sovereign act should be respected. A rule abrogated by the courts in
1892 365 . With the enactment of dissolution statute it is not permissible anymore to doubt
that dissolution power has been granted to the courts366 .
Another argument used by the opponents of dissolution is the vagueness of the
standard used to define oppression, (supra III. ?? ). But this does not jeopardize the
remedy as such. Moreover the reasonable expectation standard is invoked by the same
opponents who criticize the vagueness of the criteria. They contend that dissolution does
not fulfill the reasonable expectations of the majority367 . This argument misinterprets
reasonable expectations. A criterium that takes the expectations of all parties into
account.
An undeniable drawback of the remedy is that it is costly and time consuming. The
economic cost has two aspect. First the procedure itself is costly. Legal cost associated
with dissolution are so high that they do not compensate for the costs of hiring a
competent lawyer to draft and provide for adequate protection^68 . Second and more
important dissolution often results in loss of going concern value. An important
365
Bahls, supra note 194 at 294-295; Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892)
366 Shapiro , supra 316 note at 1 148
367
Bahls, supra note 194 at 296
368 O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at § 9.03-9
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consideration for the minority shareholders before requesting dissolution is the loss that
has already occurred due to the mismanagement. It is often wiser to stay locked in
because the actual value of the business has already dropped tremendously 369 . In theory,
the better solution is the replacement of the management team 370 . Since there is no market
for corporate control of close corporations, it is unlikely that this will happen. Thus the
threat of dissolution is useful because it allows minority to obtain a buy out. Buy out
functions as ersatz for the absent securities market. (See infra. VI.A. buy-out and
especially VI.A. 5. valuation). Buy out can make it possible to avoid loss of going concern
value, depending on the judicially imposed fair value or on the price that has been
bargained for by the parties. In any case the situation is worse if the corporation is
dissolved judicially and liquidated. Certainly, if at the auction the majority shareholder is
the only buyer. Then an artificially low bid can be expected 371 .
Another weak argument states that judicial efficiency is decreased with dissolution
cases. Courts have to spend valuable resources to determine oppressive conduct, interfere
in business judgment, and bring to a good end long and difficult dissolution proceedings.
Therefore some argue dissolution should not be made available372 .
The price for the society is also not negligible. Job loss for employees in case of
liquidation, loss for suppliers and eventually for the market as a whole if consequently the
price of the produced consumer good raises373 . But public policy also demands minority
protection, to encourage investment in growth and new businesses. Businesses who create
369
Rosalie W. O'Brien, Business and Corporate Law, 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 627, 645 (1991
)
370
Brownlee, supra note 320 at 290
571 Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 28 (but concluding that buy out is a very likely outcome of
dissolution because parties have more to gain from a buy out in almost any eventuality)
172
Brownlee, supra note 320 at 294
373
Id. at 289; Bahls, supra note 194 at 296-297 (" the undefined harm to the public")
new jobs, goods and opportunities' 74 . The economy has everything to loose from dead,
locked-in capital.
Opponents naturally blame that dissolution disrespects the business judgment
rule"
7
'. A rule, however, whose strict application in the close corporation context is not
desired (supra. Ill ?? bjr). The majority rule is naturally also invoked. The assumption of
the majority rule is that minority shareholders implicitly surrender control for their
investment376 . The potential unfairness to majority shareholders of dissolution cannot
totally be overlooked they are deprived of their inherent control rights377 .
Hillman states that the concept that close corporation should be dissolvable (at will)
rests on questionable assumptions. The myth of painless buy-out, neglects the difficulties
of such financial operation 378 . New capital must be attracted presumably from outsiders or
the majority is forced to invest greater resources than what it planned. Another
assumption is that protection of the minority is more important than corporate
permanence. However it is permanence that gives corporation the ability to attract
financing or equity investors379 .
3. A drastic remedy ? The erroneous liquidation assumption
Courts consider dissolution to be a drastic remedy, "a judicially imposed death"380 .
Although successive laws have tried to promote dissolution, those same laws never
374 Shapiro , supra 316 note at 1151
75
Brownlee, supra note 320 at 293
376 Shapiro
,
supra 316 note at 1 149
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Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 3 1
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Hillman, supra note 136 at 69-71
379
Id at 74
80 Murdock, supra note 31 at 426, 441 (Murdock gives two reasons for such qualification 1) respect for
legal entity created by legislature 2) confusion of dissolution and liquidation; Hetherington, llliquidity,
supra note 29 at 26
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abandoned the same attitude of distrust of the remedy 381 . The distrust of dissolution is
grounded in the assumption that liquidation is an unavoidable consequence of dissolution.
When courts order dissolution they will appoint a "receiver" to wind up and liquidate the
business382 . It is true that liquidation can have dramatic consequences for the value of a
going concern business. If a receiver appointed by the court sells the business in an
auction sale, typically a fire sale, the chances are high that the business will not yield
maximum value. Certainly if the business is sold in separate entities383 . Moreover many
potential investors are excluded since these kind of sales require payment of purchase
price immediately or in a brief period of time. Finally, like in many sales sellers good-will
is lost
384
. Specifically, the good relationship with customers and suppliers^ 85 . All these
considerations boost courts reluctancy to grant dissolution.
The assumption that dissolutions result in liquidation is fallacious386 . Two statistical
study show that the contrary is true. In Hetherington and Dooley's study not one viable
business was liquidated. In most cases one party bought the other out. The business was
eventually sold as a going concern to a third party. Buy out seems in fact to be the
naturally arising solution387 . Interesting is that the few businesses where liquidation
occurred, the businesses were continued or partially continued after liquidation388 .
Haynsworth reaches a few years later the same conclusion. Buy-out when available
is most frequently ordered by the courts. The buy out remedy was in the mean time made
more largely available by statutes. In 27% of the cases dissolution was ordered. In fact
181 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 40 (official comment, qualifying dissolution as a last resort, drastic
remedy)
382 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.32
383
Bahls, supra note 194 at 297
384 Id
385
O'Neill supra note 17 at 693
386
Bahls, supra note 194 at 297; Shapiro, supra 316 note at 1 1 50
387
Hetherington, /{liquidity, supra note 29 at 27, 30-34
388 Id at 32-33
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buy out cases in Haynsworth study seem to match the same percentages as dissolution
cases that resulted in buy outs in Hetherington's studyj89 .
Liquidation only occurs if both party wish that result. Otherwise a negotiated
solution will arise390 . In fact if a business is viable it will be continued, if not it will be
terminated, irrespective ofjudicial intervention391 . Dissolution influences the condition
under which a business is to be continued not its existence.
Thus, dissolution appears not to be a solution on itself but a first step towards a
(negotiated or forced) buy out. The business is continued but a transaction cost for
withdrawal is paid. Buy out equals replacement of capital. It is likely that the new capital
will come at a higher cost than the capital of the departing shareholder
392
. Evaluation of
the dissolution remedy is thus incomplete without an evaluation of the buy-out alternative
and the reasons for its increasing popularity. (. VI.)
In the mean time it can be stated that dissolution is sometimes an absolute
necessity, be it in last resort.
D. A needed relief
Authors' plead for dissolution has a long history. Carlos D. Israels lead the way in
1952 by questioning the principle of corporate permanence in a famous article393 .
Nowadays, most court behave more sympathetically towards dissolution. This suits have
increased success because they allow to gain satisfactory results for oppressed minority
89 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 53-55
40
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 27
391 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 446
392 Thompson's, dissolution, supra note 23 at 223
93 See generally, Israels, Sacred cow, supra note 1 8 ("corporate contract is not a holy sacrament")
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shareholders344 . Moreover broad standards such as reasonable expectations support courts
in ordering dissolution or other reliefs395 .
The availability of involuntary dissolution must be supported because at one point
in time it is needed. Dissolution is needed in two ways, as a final solution and more often
as part of negotiations.
Dissolution is needed as a final solution when shareholders tensions in close
corporation due to deadlock or oppression make them ineffective. Close corporations are
fragile entities working primarily on the close relationships between the participants.
Deadlock or other unsolvable tensions in close corporation are socially completely
undesirable396 . Dissolution seems then the only adequate remedy because there is no other
way outj97 . And although the majority has a right to trust that the investment of the
minority will bear the same risks as theirs this right must be limited. The majority has
some inherent rights of control of their investment and that of the minority. However
those rights do not go so far as the right to frustrate reasonable expectations of entrusted
investment. Receiving rights over other persons investments goes along with the duty to
respect the reasons that induced these investments. The risk of frustrated expectations is
laid upon the whole corporation, majority and minority. For the majority this is translated
by the right of the minority to withdraw. For the minority, the risk is translated by a right
to withdraw in limited circumstances. Only when the majority has frustrated reasonable
expectations.
394
Arthur D. Spratlin, Jr., Modern remediesfor oppression in the closely held corporation, 60 Miss. L.J.
405,417-418(1990)
395 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at §9.29
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In the sense that dissolution provides a way out, a definitive solution when conflicts
cannot be resolved amicably anymore, dissolution is an effective method' 98 . A relative
effectiveness because sometimes it is better to stay locked in and frozen out399 .
Since dissolution provides a way out, one must wonder if there are not less drastic
methods to provide for an exit. Here dissolution is used as leverage in negotiations. It is
important to understand why dissolution suits are filed. Dissolution is not a final goal but
just a mean to achieve other ends. A shareholder sues for dissolution because 1) he wants
to withdraw his investment 2) he wants other shareholders to withdraw 3) he wants to
influence corporate policy400 . Dissolution is needed for the negotiation process because it
is unrealistic to think that majority will offer a fair price if not forced too401 . The majority
has no reasons to buy extra shares. They do not need them. Petitioner is does able to
achieve his goal without that dissolution is needed as result. Dissolution suits do not
affect the existence of the firm but push negotiation forward in a given direction402 .
Dissolution has does outgrown its original goal and has become a general remedy for
dissension403 . The question becomes now how badly dissolution is needed and in which
situations ?
Some states have introduced limitations of the right to request dissolution. New
York for instance requires a 20% share ownership to request the dissolution of a close
corporation404 . A minimum percentage of ownership requirement can be found in several
398 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 85; O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §7:21 ("Suits for
dissolution seems to have had considerable success in achieving satisfactory settlements for minority
shareholders")
w
Brownlee, supra note 320 at 269, 283-295 (dissolution is not effective); Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 447
400
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 27
401 Murdock, supra note 31 at 427
402
Hetherington, Illiquidit\\ supra note 29 at 27, 30
403 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 708
404 N.Y. Bus. Corp L. § 1104(a)
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other statutes
40
". The argument for such limitation is not convincing. Why should it make
a difference what percentage of shares is owned ? These provision tend to give an
incentive for oppression of unimportant participants406 . Once a problem arise, deadlock or
oppression, all interests, however small, are endangered407 . A remedy is needed whatever
the percentage of ownership. In fact the opposite is more logical. When minorities interest
are important the burden on the majority to finance a buy out is bigger. Withdrawal of
important percentages of ownerships results in tremendous instability for the
corporation408 . Courts, irrationally, (because they see dissolution as drastic), seem to be
more willing to grant the relief when the requesting shareholder has an important interest
in the firm409 .
Supporters of the dissolution remedy suggest that it should be mandatory instead of
discretionary to overcome the reluctance of courts to use the remedy410 . Dissolution
should become mandatory once the grounds have been established. The wordings "may
dissolve
,
''4
", giving discretionary powers to the courts should be amended. This however
would make the statutes inflexible. Flexibility of remedies in the oppression of minority
context is essential. The imagination of oppressing majorities, the diversity of squeeze out
techniques must be countered by adaptable remedies. In fact one can expect the adverse
effect. As we said courts have ordered more dissolution when alternative remedies and
broader grounds and standard for dissolution developed. Without discretionary power to
choose the appropriate remedy courts will revers the existing trend, narrow the
405 Connecticut 10%, Louisiana 20% and a 6 month ownership, Massachusetts 40 %, Ohio 50 %, . . .
40b Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 40
407
Israels, Sacred cow, supra note 18 at 790
408 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 443-444
409
Id. at 444-445
410
Shapiro, supra note 316 at 1 153
411 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30 (official comment) (emphasizing the discretionary power of the court)
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interpretation of the grounds for dissolution and refuse to be forced to order a remedy
they do not fully trust.
Finally, it can be discussed if dissolution should be a primary or a last resort
remedy. A primary relief because it is not a final goal, and it helps to direct parties
negotiation in one direction. This is unreasonable if the use of less definitive reliefs is
possible. Why then not encourage courts to use them. Dissolution as a last resort remedy
encourages court to grant alternative reliefs in situations where the facts do not justify
dissolution but same some kind of intervention is necessary412 .
We pointed out that dissolution is intimately linked with buy out. Most statutes
allow a Buy out of the shares of the party requesting dissolution. Buy out can simply be
the result of negotiations influenced by a dissolution suit. And finally court can impose a
forced buy out instead of dissolution. Dissolution quite systematically results in buy out.
The effectiveness of the dissolution remedy can thus only be evaluated together with the
buy out remedy and the resulting buy out price.
Dissolution cannot be imposed by courts without leaving to the majority
shareholders an option to buy the minority out41 ". It seems that to force dissolution
without a chance of buy out is unfair for the majority and not beneficial to the minority.
Dissolution is there to help liquidity not liquidation, therefore shareholders right to cause
dissolution should be circumscribed by the right of the majority to purchase plaintiffs
shares at a fair price
414
. A possible question is if dissolution is needed as a step before buy
out or if the buy out remedy can be imposed absent dissolution. A question that will be
addressed (infra. VI.A. 2.)
412 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 89
413 See also, Hetherington. Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 34
414 Rodman Elfin, A critique ofthe proposed statutory close corporation supplement to the model business
corporation act, 8 J. Corp L. 439, 45 1 (1983)
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The acceptance of dissolution as a valid remedy is influenced by the need to
balance different objectives. The judge must balance between the expectations of
minority shareholders and the voting and management rights of the majority 415 . In more
general terms dissolution rest on the belief that the interest of the minority are more
important than the interest society has in the permanence of corporations416 .
415 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 26
416 Henderson, supra note 349 at 206; Brownlee, supra note 320 at 285
Chapter VI. Buy out and other alternatives
A. Forced buy out
1 . "Voluntary" buy out
Buy out in a court proceedings occurs in two type of situations. In the first, and our
primary concern, buy out is directly requested by the plaintiff to withdraw his interest. In
the second case a motion for buy out is filed after plaintiff sought dissolution. Buy out
here is not directly requested by the plaintiff but "voluntarily" by the defendant to avoid
dissolution. We discuss "voluntary buy out" briefly.
Several states gave all corporations or majority shareholders the right to petition for
a buy out when dissolution is requested417 . Under these statutes once petition to purchase
is filed the dissolution proceeding is stayed418 . Other states, like New Jersey, do not
explicitly link voluntary buy out to dissolution but a shareholder may move to buy out in
any court proceeding4ig .
417
For instance, California. New Jersey, Rhode Island, West Virginia; The states following the MBCA see
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.34 (as amended in 1991); E.g. Illinois, New York, Maryland and Wisconsin
only for close corporations
418 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 49
4,9
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A: 12-7(8)
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Although under this provisions a shareholder cannot request to be bought out, the
court in Brenner v. Berkowitz420 indirectly recognized its inherent power to order a buy out.
The advantages of voluntary buy out are that dissolution is avoided and that
shareholders can prevent airing of internal corporate dissension in the courts421 . The
official comment notes that the section was introduced to avoid strategic abuse of
dissolution proceedings422 . Most states do not give courts the discretion to reject a petition
to buy out. This could be useful if a lesser remedy or buy out by the plaintiff would be
more appropriate423 .
2. Forced buy out: independent from dissolution ?
Buy out and dissolution are both extraordinary reliefs424 . Even though buy out is
less drastic than dissolution it is still a drastic remedy. The bought out shareholder is
eliminated from the corporation. If he did not wish that result he will certainly consider
the remedy to be radical 425 .
The "supplement ** therefore specifies that since dissolution is the ultimate remedy
the buy out solution must always be evaluated before426 . This is the so called "tiering of
remedies
,,
whereby ordinary reliefs (see infra VI.B.l.) have to be considered before buy
out and buy out before dissolution.
The grounds to request dissolution, buy outs and ordinary reliefs are identical. This
begs the question if the level of oppression must be the same for the less drastic buy out
4:0 634 A.2d 109 (N.J. App. Div. 1993)
421 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 49
422 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.34 (official comment)(introduced in 1991)
423 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 49-50
424 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42, 43
425
Id. at § 42 (official comment )("A court ordered buy out is a drastic remedy")
426
Id.
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than for the last resort dissolution remedy ?427 . That buy out is considered less drastic than
dissolution does not mandate the definition of standards to determine different degrees of
egregious conduct. Rather, judges' discretion should be respected. Differences in
necessary level of oppression are not dictated by the difference between dissolution and
buy out. Both in fact are very similar extraordinary, drastic reliefs. The question of level
of oppression is more appropriate for ordinary reliefs. In any case the guide for the
appropriate remedy remains its social effectiveness not the level of oppression, (see infra.
VI.B.l. & VLB. 3.) It is however true that courts take the amount of oppression into
account when they choose a remedy.
The precedent chapter concluded that dissolution cannot be ordered without giving
an opportunity to the majority to propose a buy out. The contrary however is not true. Buy
out as an independent remedy allows the oppressed shareholder to receive a value for his
shares that he could impossibly receive in a liquidation proceeding. Buy out has a
function as a way out of deadlock and as a punishment for oppressive conduct. The buy
out remedy therefore must also develop as a solution independent from dissolution.
According to the "supplement" buy out can always be avoided by unwilling shareholders.
Instead they can allow the corporation to be dissolved. The designated purchasers will
prefer dissolution if the economic prospects of the business are bleak428 . The idea is that it
is unfair to impose a buy out without giving the purchaser an opportunity to dissolve.
This right, however, negates the punitive function of the buy out remedy and is thus
questionable. The right of the majority to still pursue dissolution, and thus pay liquidation
value, should be left to the discretion of the court.
It is nonetheless true that buy out developed as an independent remedy out of the
perception that dissolution proceedings are a costly and unnecessary first step towards
4:7
Miller, supra note 162 at 245-247 (pleading for a more liberal approach of the interpretation of
oppression for remedies less drastic than dissolution)
4:8
Id. at § 42 (b) (5) (d) and (official comment)
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buy out429 . A direct right to request buy out has the advantage to eliminate the use of
dissolution motions as tactical weapons in a buy out negotiation.
3. The legal recognition of the buy out remedy.
The first enacted buy out remedies took the form of an alternative to dissolution. A
party could not move to be bought out but only to buy the other party out. Following the
example of section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948 four other states enacted
buy out as an alternative to dissolution4,0 . In the last years many states have enacted buy
out as an alternative to dissolution. Recent legislation authorize buy out separately from
dissolution, often only for close corporations4^. Most general corporate dissolution
statute do no provide for any other remedy than dissolution432 . The only alternative
remedy in the MBCA is since 1991 the right to buy out the shares of party petitioning for
dissolution433 .
Courts have held that buy out like other alternative reliefs can be granted on
equitable grounds434 . In Stefano v. Coppock4^
,
Davis v. Sheeriri136
,
and Balvik v.
Sylvester43 the courts held a buy out appropriate in equity even though the remedy was
A2q
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 46
430
California, Connecticut, South Carolina and West Virginia; See Stuart L. Pachman, Corporation evenly
divided: judicial remediesfor equal shareholders, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 234 (1993) (for a brief history of
buy out)
431 Arizona (for close corporations), Illinois. Maine, Michigan (for unlisted shares). North Dakota (any
equitable relief); Murdock, supra note 31 at 462. Only for close corporations and following the supplement
are: e.g. Georgia, Montana, South Carolina, Wisconsin
432
Henderson, supra note 349 at 214; But remedies such as provisional directors and custodians are
increasingly enacted, although rarely used
433 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.34 (introduced in 1991)
434 Henderson, supra note 349 at 2 14
43
' 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985)
436 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex App. Houston 1988)
437 411 N. W.2d383(N. D. 1987)
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not available in the respective statutes. These courts argue that dissolution statutes are
remedial, and that therefore they can certainly grant less drastic remedies. Virginia
courts, have defended a contrary view of exclusivity of statutory relief' 8 . They are in the
minority. Buy out enjoys an increasing popularity. Besides cases ordering buy out in
equity many are now ordered based on statutory provisions.
In re Wiedy 's Furniture Clearance Center Co.. Inc.'139, the majority was forced to
buy the shares of the minority even though buy out had not been requested. Oppressive
conduct of the majority had frustrated reasonable expectations of the plaintiff. The buy
out price ordered was higher than the liquidation price. A very flexible order was issued
in Gimpel v. Bolstein44" where the court ordered that the shareholder elect or to
commence paying substantial dividends or to make a good faith purchase of the share of
the minority. In re Kemp & Beatly, Inc.'1 '11 the corporation could choose between buy out
and dissolution. The difference between the two cases can be explained by the more
obvious oppressive conduct in Kemp & Beatly442 . In Orchard v. Covelli443 buy out was
ordered at a price that had been offered to other investors. The court also ordered the
payment of a prejudgment interest. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co 444 is a case where
buy out was ordered on a breach of fiduciary duty ground. Because the Minnesota
court,
445
in a criticized narrow statutory interpretation, refused to order a buy out the
Minnesota statute was amended to emphasis the possibility of ordering buy out446 . The
438 Jordon v. Bowman Apple Products, 728 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1990) (refusing the motion for common
law buy out); Giannoti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2D 725 (Va. 1990).
430 487 N.Y. S.2d 901 (N.Y. 1985)
440 477 N.Y. S.2d 1014, 1022 (N.Y. Sup. Court. 1984)
44l 473N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984)
44: Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 71
443 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W. D. Penn. 1984), aff d, 802 F. 2d 448 (3rd Cir. 1986)
444 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
445 Sundberg v. Lambert Lumber Co., 390 NW.2d 352 (Minn. App. 1986)
446 Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 subd 3b (effective August 1. 1986)
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availability of the buy out remedy has been restricted by the same court via the
availability of direct action. In Skoglund v. Brady'1 '' , a surprising decision of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals it was declared that a direct cause of action for buy out will
not be available if all shareholders have been harmed equally.
Courts are in general more willing than in the past to order buy out448 . They
however still require serious misconduct as a precondition for relief44 . The recognition of
buy out and the preference over dissolution is motivated by court's impression that it is a
less harsh remedy450 .
4. Evaluation of the buy out remedy
Buy out has been qualified as the most prevalent relief 451 and most popular
alternative for dissolution452 . Haynsworth study shows that buy out is the most frequent
relief ordered by courts or elected by defendants45\ Compared with an earlier study by
Hetherington and Dooley454 , negotiated buy out have been replaced by court ordered buy
out. This is due to new legislative provisions and increasing willingness of courts to order
the remedy455 .
Buy out arise automatically as an alternative for dissolution in a healthy business. If
one party wants to continue the business both have an interest to reach an agreement. The
seller risks a depreciated price if the corporation is dissolved while the buyer risks to be
447 541 N.W. 2d 17 (Minn. App. 1996)
448 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 720-72
1
449
Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 86
450 Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24 at 721-722
4>l Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 43
452 Henderson, supra note 349 at 217
451 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 53
454
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 3 1
4
^ Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 54 (See also supra. V.?? both studies are mentioned)
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eliminated in an auction by a third party or to have to pay a control premium besides all
the expenses caused by the dissolution proceeding 4
"6
. The single most important
determinant of buy out is the success of the firm. Buy out occurs almost systematically in
profitable firms plagued by dissension457 .
The remedy has some characteristics that plead for a wider application. Buy out is a
definitive solution. Getting rid of dissension at a fair price is always satisfactory for the
corporation and for the minority who is able to withdraw458 . As an alternative to
dissolution buy out offers two theoretical advantage. The business is continued and no
value is lost unnecessarily459 .
Hetherington and Dooley proposed buy out as exclusive remedy since dissolution
just functions as price fixing mechanism460 . In fact dissolution and its alternatives "are
costly and ineffectual and considerations of equity and efficiency justify permitting the
minority to withdraw its investment for any reason"461 . They therefore plead for an
unconditional buy out right. Moreover such remedy would reduce the necessity to draft
complex buy out arrangements resulting in a decrease in transaction cost. The availability
of buy out has an undeniable preventive function as disincentive for opportunistic
conduct462 . But automatic buy out of the minority could frustrate reasonable expectations
more than the oppression itself463 . Buy out is not always necessary that is why a whole set
of alternative reliefs was developed over the time
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 28
457
Id. at jj
458 Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 53
459
Bahls, supra note 194 at 298
460
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 34; Adam Chernichaw, Note, Oppressed shareholders in close
corporations: a market oriented statutory* remedy, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 501, 525-526 (1994) (proposing
dissolution and buy out as only available relief)
461
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 6
46:
Id. at 47
463
Bahls, supra note 194 at 3 1
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Buy out is certainly not a perfect solution. There are circumstances where it is
better to stay locked in than bought out. It is the case when a shareholder expects to get
liquidation value while going concern value is much higher. He then chooses to stay lock
in under the assumption that in a near future his interest will be purchased at a higher
value. Such decision depends much on the ratio of profitability to capital 464 . To award a
fair value for shareholder's stock does not always compensate for the loss of expectation
of participation in management465 .
An argument recurring for all proposed remedies is the risk of abuse by the
minority to extort concessions. For buy out the fear is enhanced by the financial
implications of the remedy. This abuse of minority argument, however, does not
correspond with the picture provided by the numerous corporate dissension cases466 .
Easterbrook and Fischel point out that a buy out creates liquidity problems for the
corporation467 . Hillman speaks of "the myth of painless buy out". He reminds that the
withdrawing capital has to be replaced at a usually higher cost. The transaction renders
the corporation vulnerable and subject to the uncertainties of the credit market. The
borrowing capacity of the corporation is highly reduced. Eventually a new stockholder
has to be attracted. An investor that could request significant concessions from the
majority468 . Hillman disagrees that a shareholder should have the right to inflict such
strain on his co-venturers because the commitment to the close corporation is based on
the idea of permanence469 . But if the difficulty in finding equity investors for close
corporations is caused by the "lock-in effect'
1
the availability of a buy out remedy might
464 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 447-450
465
Bahls, supra note 194 at 299
466
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 49
467
Easterbrook, Agency cost, supra note 5 at 289-290;
468
Hillman, supra note 136 at 70-72
469
Id. at 72-73
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in fact facilitate investment in close corporations
470
. Moreover as leveraged buy outs have
demonstrated in the latest years when a business is profitable acquisition can be
financed471 . Rationally courts should be less reluctant to order buy out when the minority
has only a small interest in the corporation472 . (Infra VI.AAb.(iii) Installment)
Finally, valuation is a difficult and expensive process. The cost of buy out includes
procedural and transaction cost of negotiating an agreement to mitigate the impact of a
perceived unsatisfactory court decree 47-1 . The cost of the remedy makes it often at least an
unpractical if not unavailable remedy.
Despite undeniable drawbacks it is clear that the development of the buy out
remedy deeply changes the posture of minority shareholders474 . They are no longer
helpless. They are able to withdraw under economical reasonable conditions when the
majority acts oppressively. This right has been wisely disconnected in the last year from
dissolution. An unduly burdensome and unnecessary step for a business that is to be
continued. And a necessity to assure that the withdrawing shareholder will receive a
"fair*' going concern value. An improvement which price, a questioning of the traditional
stabilityand permanence of corporations and of the immunity of the majority, is worth to
pay.
470
Hetherington, llliquidity, supra note 29 at 50
471 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 444
472
Id.
473
Bahls, supra note 194 at 336
474 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 484-485
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4. The terms of a buy out
a. Who is bought out?
Until recently courts always ordered the buy out of the minority by the majority.
The rationale behind it is that the majority, as the main owner, has more rights to stay in
the business than the minority. Moreover, in most cases it is only the majority who has
the necessary financial strength to pay for a buy out and the capability to operate a going
concern business475 . In 1996 the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mullenberg v. Bikon
Corp./ 6 opened the way for buy out by the minority. The unanimous court held that in
exceptional cases courts may force the majority shareholders of a close corporation to sell
their shares. The court found that the majority was perfectly able to remain in the
American market, compete with the corporation of the minority and thereby fulfill their
original expectations477 . The minority was also found to have sufficient funds to
consummate a stock purchase. The decision was further supported by the clear oppressive
conduct of the majority and by the fact that the minority managed for years the day to day
operations of the company478 . A few English precedents had already recognized the
possibility of forced buy out of the majority479 . Buy out by the minority is supported by
Hetherington's and Dooley's study that showed that the minority sometimes purchases
475
Bahls, supra note 194 at 299
476 669 A.2d 1382 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1996)
477 Id at 1389-90
478
Daniel A. Ippolito, Survey, Corporate law- Closely held corporations- Courts may, in rate
circumstances, order the buy out ofmajority shareholders ofa closely-held corporation by oppressed
minority shareholders, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1369 (1996) (for a discussion of the Mullenberg case)
479 Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths, Ltd. [1970], 3 All E. R. 57, 1 W. L. R. 1042 (Ch.)
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majority's stock when parties negotiate a way out of dissension480 . Moreover, equity
requires that the party with clean hands, the innocent minority is granted protection481 .
Courts ordering a buy out should take a number of factors into consideration to
decide who will be forced to sell it's shares482 :
(1) The respective financial situation of the shareholders
(2) The ability to restrain the selling shareholder from competing with the buying
shareholder
(3) The ability of the shareholders to operate the business profitably
(4) The ability of the oppressive shareholder to pay damages for the loss he inflicted.
Under equal factors, there is no reason to give an advantage to the oppressive
majority over the innocent minority483 . The same factors are used to decide which party
should prevail in a 50%/50% deadlock. There are only few cases dealing with such
situation484 .
b. Other terms
(i). The complexity of negotiated terms
Statutes in general should grant to the courts the necessary flexibility to include at
discretion all provisions that lawyers would include in privately negotiated agreements485 .
However, it must be kept in mind that terms of negotiated buy out can be awfully
480
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 31 (3 cases out 54 involuntary' dissolution cases)
481
Bahls, supra note 194 at 300
482
Id. at 299 (citing Hendley v. Lee 676 F. Supp. 1 3 1 7, 1 327 (D.S.C. 1 987) (also considering which party
would suffer less tax consequences)
483
Id. at 300
484 See generally Stuart L. Pachman, Corporation evenly divided: judicial remediesfor equal shareholders,
24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 234, 250-252 (1993) (discussing the choice between equal shareholders)
48
' Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 49
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complex. Agreements will include: warranties, covenants not to compete, provisions
addressing the fiscal consequences, installment payments and alternative remedies for
default486 . Courts can impossibly master the complexity of such agreements. Therefore
courts have the tendency to issue simple buy out orders ordering cash payment on the day
the seller transfers the stock487 . But, some important terms should be specified by the
courts. The "supplement* ' list a few terms that the court can specify if deemed
appropriate. Among those, installment and agreement not to compete488 . The aim is to
"minimize the financial strain on the purchasers"489 , although some financial disruption is
inevitable490 .
Parties may usually petition the court later on to modify the terms of the purchase
because "changes in the financial or legal ability of the corporation or other purchaser to
complete the purchase justify modification"491 .
(ii). Agreement not to compete
Anti competition agreement should be required when the value of shareholders
stock includes "good will". Courts have in general been hesitant to restrict competition492
486
Bahls, supra note 194 at 303
487
Id. at 304
488 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42 (b) (2)-(5):
(b) (2) specify the terms of the purchase, including if appropriate terms for installment payments,
subordination of the purchase obligation to the rights of the corporation's other creditors, security for a
deferred purchase price, and a covenant not to compete or other restriction on the seller;
(b) (3) require the seller to deliver all his shares to the purchaser upon receipt of the purchase price or the
first installment of the purchase price;
(b) (4) provide that after the seller delivers his shares he has no further claim against the corporation, . . .
(b) (5) provide that if the purchase is not completed in accordance with the specified terms the corporation
is to be dissolved . . .
489 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42 (b) (2) (official comment)
490
Hillman, supra note 136 at 83
491 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42 (c)
49:
Bahls, supra note 194 at 304
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and most statute are deficient on that point. The potential harm to the corporation of a
competing shareholder can be terrible. Therefore, it is better when necessary to deal with
the issue at the same time the buy out order is issued49j . Although complex, it is useful to
leave to the courts the possibility to restrain competition if deemed necessary
(iii). Installment
A few legislatures gave statutory power to their courts to order instalment444 . Other
courts naturally may always use their equitable powers. Courts hesitate however because
installment makes from the minority a creditor of the corporation. The minority assumes
then the risk that the majority will siphon the assets of the corporation495 .
Structuring a buy out using installment payments minimizes a value decrease of the
corporation. The borrowing ability of the corporation and its cash flow is not hit as
hard446 . But courts are ill-equipped to tailor such installment to the need of both the
corporation and its shareholders. Everybody would be better off if the parties negotiated a
solution. The court can give an incentive by including a minority discount in the valuation
of the shares. Buyer is than eager to negotiate an installment to avoid the costs of
illiquidity while seller wishes to recuperate the value of the discount447 . Hillman argues
that the burden of establishing the need for instalment and a reasonable appropriate period
of time during which payments will occur should be on those who desire to continue the
business. The danger is that these remaining participants might try later on to invoke
either relevant statutory restrictions on distributions of funds to shareholder or financial
493 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 48
494
e.g. Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota. But see California and New Jersey both requiring cash payments
495
Bahls, supra note 194 at 334
496
Id.
497
Id. at 336
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hardship. In that case the withdrawing shareholder should be entitled to request
dissolution for default in payment498 .
5. Valuation
a. Introduction
The importance of valuation is tremendous. The fairness and efficiency of buy out
can only be evaluated correctly by judging the price at which the buy out is going to
occur. The method of valuation will determine the size of the pay out which on his turn
affects the ease for the purchaser of financing this payout499 .
Valuation is a quantifying process, that cannot always assure the shareholder that
the purchase order will make them whole. Even if all quantitative elements would be
correctly evaluated many subjective elements such as expectations cannot be included500 .
Only valuation at going concern value can meet the frustrated expectations of the
oppressed shareholder. The corporation must then be valued as a whole and a percentage
of ownership applied, not valuation of individual shares 501 . The traditional proponents of
corporate permanence argue the contrary. Hillman for instance deems "fair" that a
shareholder should not receive more than the liquidation value. He reasons that since
dissolution is the ultimate remedy a shareholder has no other expectations than to receive
liquidation value. Moreover, he argues that because majority shareholders continue the
498
Hillman, supra note 136 at 83
499 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 445, 47
1
500
Bahls, supra note 194 at 300
501 Anthony, supra note 5 1 at 1 1 87
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business after the buy out they should receive the entire going concern value 502 . The
California statute for instance mandates a liquidation standard for buy out 503 .
Most statutes and cases however apply willing seller/willing buyer model as in
dissenter's right cases. This means valuation as a going concern rather than on a
liquidation basis. Liquidation value usually results in enrichment of the majority and
prejudice to the minority 504 .
Valuation is already a difficult exercise. In close corporations, the exercise flirts
with the arbitrary. Uncertainty is even greater due to the lack of market and the lack of
reliable financial information 505 . On top of that many appraisers are people who are
attracted by the growth in this service industry and lack any serious qualification506 .
The incredible complexity of valuation and the number of issues that must be
considered tend to support the argument that valuation procedures and methods should be
left to courts so as to adapt to the variations of every specific case507
b. Fair value
Statute admonish courts to determine "fair value" for the shares that will be bought
out
508
. "Fair value" is a vague undefined concept509 . It is not equal to "fair market value".
"Fair value" implies statutory recognition of the inappropriateness of market value in the
50:
Hillman, supra note 136 at 82
503
Cal. Corp. Code § 2000 (however it does not exclude going concern value totally)
504 Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 44
505
Bahls, supra note 194 at 301 (The management can also easily falsify financial information)
506 Id at 300
507
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 57
508 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42 (a)
19 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 702 (fair value is a price reasonable under all
circumstances); re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeil & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 60 (Me. 1979)
(Fair value is "more akin to an artistic composition than to a scientific process")
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close corporation context 510 . While hypothetical market value is a positive concept, fair
value is inherently normative'". The school oflavv and economics leaded by Hasterbrook
and Fischel avoids normative analysis and defines fair value as market value. This
approach negates the impact of the legal framework of close corporations, on share
value 512 .
The official comment of the "supplement" explicitly promotes the use of dissenter's
rights principles of valuation for buy out 513 . The view is shared by several courts who do
not think that the different nature of the two proceedings affect valuation analysis514 .
The statutory definition of "fair value" in dissenters rights contestation is not of real
help because it remains vague 515 . South Carolina ads to this definition "that the value of
the shares is to be determined by techniques that are accepted generally in the financial
community" 516 .
510 Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Betrayed, belittled . . . but triumphant: claims in closely
held corporations, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1 173, 1 186 (1996)
511
Zenichi Shishido, The fair value ofminority stock in closely held corporations, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 65,
66 (1993) (the impressive analysis of fair value in this article is based on a normative concept)
512 Shishido, supra 51 1 note at 67
513 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42 (official comment)("Fair value is to be determined under principles
developed in dissenters' rights and other valuation cases")
5,4 Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc.,
.486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 1985); Santee Oil v. Cox, 217 S.E.2d 789 (S.C. 1975), those courts argue
that the standard cited in both procedures is identical, that is "fair value"; But see Charland v. County View
Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991) ( valuations in buy out and appraisal are different and separate
issues)
515 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 (3) (" Fair value, with respect to a dissenter's shares, means the value of
the shares immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects,
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion would be
inequitable")
516
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-13-101(3)
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c. The inclusion of normative factors in valuation ?
Valuation theories are in general conservative. It can be explained by the fact that
they are often tax driven. This attitude questions the ability of valuation methods to
include subjective elements like "oppression" or employment517 .
Should oppressive conduct also be taken into account when valuing the shares?
Some statute indirectly refer to that possibility518 . This would however complicate more,
an already complex valuation process. Oppressive behavior can always handled in a
separate common law claim for damages519 . Courts have also refused to have valuation
affected by the misconduct of the minority520 .
A decision where the money shareholders is ordered to buy out the work
shareholders seems logical. But in the close corporations context jobs are often more
valuable than capital. A more liberal approach to valuation should make it possible to
value the lost of earnings due to buy out more accurately 521 . Like for instance, in Hendley
v. Lee 3" where a granted salary adjustment had a dramatic impact upon valuation.
d. The date of valuation
Some statute have set out a date of valuation, usually the day the suit was filed or
because the action may depress the value of the shares, the day before the suit was
filed
523
.
517 Murdock. supra note 31 at 471-472
518
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14a:12-7(8)(a)
519
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 57
'20 Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc. 513 N.W. 2d834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
521 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 472
522 676 F. Supp. 1317(D.S.C. 1987)
523 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.75 1 subd 2; N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1 1 1
8
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In Hendley v. Lee524 the court stated that generally the value of the shares should be
determined as of the date of trial. However, in oppression cases the date of ouster seems
to be more appropriate. But this criteria is not always helpful. Oppression often occurs
slowly and over a long period of time so that it is difficult to determine a date of ouster.
Certainly if no expulsion occurs 525 .
Courts, that value stock at a date after wrongdoing can compensate for the
depressed value in two ways. They can consider the amount of damages to be an asset of
the company for purpose of appraisal. Alternatively, they can order, besides a share
purchase based on "actual" value, a payment of damages based on diminution of value
due to wrongdoing by the majority526 . The New Jersey statute gives the broadest
authorization to the courts for determining date of valuation: "as of the date of
commencement of the action or such earlier or later date deemed equitable by the court,
plus or minus any adjustment deemed equitable by the court" 527 .
e. Methods of valuation
The court may appoint appraisers to value the corporation528 . It may rely on their
opinion but not delegate the power to determine fair value. If courts do not appoint
appraisers the suit develops rapidly in a battle of the experts 529 .
5:4 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1327 (D.S.C. 1987)
5:5 Henderson, supra note 349 at 219 n. 119
526
Bahls, supra note 194 at 305 (citing, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 848-849,
353 N.E. 2d 657, 661 (1976) (where the court ordered payment of damages because of oppression))
5:7
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:12-7(8)(a)
5:8 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.30 (d); Adam Chernichaw, Note, Oppressed shareholders in close
corporations: a market oriented statutory remedy-, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 501, 522 (1994) (proposed a
systematic use of appraisers)
529 Anthony, supra note 5 10 at 1 1 88
104
In early years Delaware courts developed the so called Delaware Block valuation
method 530 . The "fair value " standard cannot be limited to a single method of valuation.
Three major factors must be considered 1 ) net asset value, that can be evaluated by
appraisers. 2) the market value, who is especially difficult to determine in close
corporation when the market is thin or not existent531 . Eventually based on the offer of a
potential buyer. 3) the earnings of investment value of the dissenting stock. Generally the
company average earnings in previous years multiplied by a multiplier. The earnings
method can in given circumstances yield the highest valuation. A method Hillman
fiercely opposes arguing that the withdrawing partner should not benefit any more from
the corporate venture
532
. The problem with earnings valuation is that in close corporations
earnings are distorted by owner compensation. Data such as gross billing can provide an
alternative533 . Each factor should then be weighted as to his relative importance for the
value of the dissenting stock.
The Delaware Block however is to limited. It does not allow to make a difference
between a growth-oriented and an income-based company534 . Nowadays, courts try to
take "all relevant factors
1
" into consideration^ 5 . The recognition of the complexity of
valuation factors has made his way through statutory enactments. The "supplement", for
instance, lists the following factors that courts should consider to determine the value of
the shares:
".
. . among other relevant evidence the going concern value of the
corporation, any agreement among shareholders fixing the price or specifying
a formula for determining share value for any purpose, the recommendations
530 See e.g. Santee Oil v. Cox. 217 S.E.2d 789 (S.C. 1975) (discussing the Delaware block method)
531 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 473
532 Hillman, supra note 136 at 82
533 Murdock, supra note 31 at 45
1
534 Anthony, supra note 5 1 at 1188
535
Del. Stat. § 262(h)
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of appraisers (if any) appointed by the court, and any legal constraints on the
corporation's ability to purchase the shares" 536 .
The reference to "techniques that are accepted generally in the financial community 53
reflects this same pluralistic approach.
For Prof. Shishido, fair value consist of cash flow discounted value, "which is the
result of allowing the majority to keep entrepreneurial rewards and giving all shareholders
a share in the hidden cash flow" 538 . This results in a "best use" value method539 .
The effect of a buy out agreement on valuation is not clear. If the situation giving
rise to buy out is not covered by the buy out agreement. Then the agreement is merely non
conclusive evidence. The contractual buy out price will be used if the agreement covers
the circumstances unless the buy out price is inequitable 540 .
The cases do not provide for a uniform clear picture of methods of valuation.
Courts have used in the post Delaware Block area various valuation techniques.
Valuation based on multiples of gross revenue, adjustment of earlier price paid by those
acquiring a majority interest and discounted cash flow54 '. Courts most commonly use for
close corporations the investment value based on company's earnings or on a variety of
factors'"
42
. In Segall v. Shore' 4 " the court rejected the use of "liquidation appraisal"
536 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 42 (b) (1)
537
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-13-101(3)
38
Shishido, supra 51 1 note at 67, 104 (Entrepreneurial rewards: reasonable salary, synergistic effect (effect
of the combination of a related second company the buyer already possess), expectations of enhancing the
companies value. Hidden Cash Flow: retained earnings, hidden retained earnings (due to excessive
depreciation, e.g., due to high salaries or loans to the majority), hidden dividends. When asset value is
higher than cash flow value, excessive asset value should also be included (a corporation that should
theoretically be dissolved but is not for non economical reasons)
539
Id. at 110
540 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 45 (citing Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751 subd. 2 explicitly recognizing the
right of the courts to ignore the agreement if the terms specified "are unreasonable under all the
circumstances of the case")
541 Murdock. supra note 3 1 at 473
54: O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 9.34
543 236S.E.2d316(S.C. 1977)
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whereby an amount equal to tax liability is deducted from the value of the stock because
there is "no reason to presuppose liquidation". The corporation must be valued as a going
concern. In Hendley v. Lee344 a capitalization of earnings approach was used. The adjusted
pretax income for the most current fiscal year was multiplied by an "earnings
multiplier"545 .
f. Discounts
(i). In general
Discounts are reductions of the value of the stock due to his negative qualities546 .
These discounts, when applied, reduce on average the purchase price of the shares by ten
to twenty-five percent547 .
Some have opined that discounts should never be taken into account or at least not
in the close corporation context548 . Similarly, it has been argued that discounts can
properly be applied in a willing buyer-seller transaction but never for court ordered sales
between insiders549 . One of the recurring argument is that allowing discounts in
oppression cases is an incentive for oppression550 . Furthermore discounts frustrate the
544 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1327 (D.S.C. 1987)
545 Adjusted pretax income is composed of the company pretax income + non functional compensation paid
to each officer. The court accepted a earnings multiplier of 4.48. The multiplier was found by dividing the
value of the company in a given year by the company's adjusted pretax income in that year.
546
Henderson, supra note 349 at 224
547 Thompson's, dissolution, supra note 23 at 234
548 Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation ofBusiness Interests, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 457, 489-490 (1982)
[hereinafter Haynsworth, Valuation] (opining that as a general rule courts should not apply discounts for
minority interests) {See also generally, for a thorough discussion of discounts); Murdock, supra note 3 1 at
472 (discounts are appropriate in a tax setting but absolutely not in a state court proceeding)
540 Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1330 (D.S.C. 1987)
50 Henderson, supra note 349 at 227-230 (discussing discount cases where it appears that this argument is
systematically invoked)
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reasonable expectations of the minority 5". Finally, the increasing number of remedies for
the minority guarantees a more realistic share valuation"' 2 . Is then a per-se rule never to
apply discounts unhealthy ? Is it not necessary to differenciate between the expectations
of original participants and investors who acquired participation later on and to value
their interest with other factors ?553 .
The applicability of discounts is different in every jurisdiction 554 . Courts, generally,
do not apply discount with a few exception for the lack of marketability discount555 .
As a general rule discounts unnecessarily complicate valuations and depreciate
minority interests thereby frustrating further on not well motivated basis their
expectations.
(ii). Minority discount
Applies because the acquisition of a non-controlling interest is worth less. It does
not change the repartition of power in the corporation556 . The discount is justified by the
assumption that the minority should not be paid more than what they would receive in a
transaction at arms-length557 . Most courts rejected the minority discounts for two
reasons
558
. First, because in close corporation the majority already controls the
corporation so it is of no importance for control that it is forced to buy additional
551 Haynsworth, Valuation, supra note 548 at 489-490
552 Murdock, supra note 3 1 at 482
553
Bahls, supra note 194 at 302
554 Henderson, supra note 349 at 224
555 O'NEAL'S, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 2 at § 9.34
5,6 Haynsworth, Valuation, supra note 548 at 492-493
557
Bahls, supra note 194 at 302 (citing McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1986))
558 But see McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasizing
courts discretion to fashion appropriate relief, rejecting the "oppression" argument and authorizing minority
discount)
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shares559 . Second, the minority would receive its full pro-rata share in a dissolution
proceeding there is no reason why this should be different in a buy out560 . It has been
suggested to differentiate between those who acquired share by subscription upon
incorporation and those who acquired shares by transfer. In the later category a minority
discount is justified because they most likely acquired the shares at a discounted price 561 .
In parallel a control premium should not be paid by the minority to a majority who
is forced to sell her shares562 .
(iii). Marketability discounts
Close corporations have no ready market for their shares and it's stock is often
subject to transfer restriction. This reality reduces the value of the stock563 . A few courts
have accepted the marketability discount because, whether the majority or the minority
acquires the shares, the discount reflects the lesser value of shares that cannot be freely
traded 564 . The assumption that all shareholder groups suffer from the lack of marketability
identically is flawed. It is often easier to sell a majority participation, presumably with a
control premium" 65 . Marketability discounts are also rejected with the same argument
used for other discounts, namely, that it would be unfair to authorize a discount to a
majority who has acted oppressively.
SS9 Henderson, supra note 349 at 226
60 Assuming that buy is an equivalent alternative to dissolution and not a less drastic remedy granted at a
lower level of oppression
561
Bahls, supra note 194 at 302-303
56: Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 45
563 Henderson, supra note 349 at 224, 226
564 Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc., 514 N.Y.S. 2d 120 (App. Div. 1987)
565
Bahls, supra note 194 at 303-304
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(iv). Key man discount
A reduction of the value of the stock due to the departure of a significant executive.
This discount has only been found appropriate "in cases where the executive has already
left the company and the company is unable to find a suitable replacement 56 '
(v). Other adjustments:
Reduced liquidity discount due to buy out. This discount functions as an incentive
to negotiate an installment' 67 , (supra VI.A.4.b.(iii)).
Adjustment for damages are supported by the view that conduct is part of valuation.
This can be replaced by a common law damage action568 , (supra VI.A.5.C.)
It is not clear if courts may award a prejudgment interest. Denail of prejudgment
interest is quite prejudicial for the seller certainly if the price of the shares is determined a
few years after the suit is filed. Court are reluctant to grant prejudgment interest. This
attitude encourages delaying tactics form the defendant. Courts should be allowed to
award interest from a date the court deem equitable 569 . Moreover it is argued that court
should be given the authority to impose expert fees and attorneys' fees for arbitrary,
vexatious or bad faith litigation570 .
566 Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1330 (D.S.C. 1987)
5b7
Bahls, supra note 194 at 336
568
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 57
569 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 45-46
570 Id at 47
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(g) The illusion of predictability.
The withdrawing shareholder is fairly treated when he receives the real going
concern value for his shares. Dead asset valuation is an incentive for oppressive conduct.
Determining going concern value has proven to be a fairly artistic exercise. Shareholders
however need certainty to evaluate the risks taken and the appropriateness of remedial
actions. Here lies the unsolvable contradiction of valuation. Methods of valuation listing
a limited amount of criteria have proven to be inaccurate and unfair. Methods trying to
incorporate all relevant quantitative and normative elements, have not proven to be more
effective. They do not provide for any certainty and flirt with the arbitrary. Judge's
discretion should be preserved so as to permit adaptability of valuations. References to
appraisers, battle of experts and "techniques that are accepted generally in the financial
community" while not providing illusive certainty, increase the predictability of going
concern valuation.
B. Alternative remedies
1 . Introduction
Alternative remedies sprang out of the willingness to grant relief for (minor)
dissension. The perception that buy out and dissolution lead sometimes to economic
waste, supported further the adoption of alternatives571 . Statutes who provide alternatives
to dissolution, like buy out or other ordinary reliefs increase the probability that a judge
Bahls, supra note 194 at 307
will effectively order a remedy for dissension 572 . Although alternative remedies where
enacted to promote relief including dissolution but one can also see in their enactment the
distrust on legislative level of the dissolution remedy. Accordingly, some fear that it is
probable that the presence of alternative remedies will increase courts reluctancy to order
last resort remedies like dissolution and buy out573 . On the other hand the parallelism
between the development of alternative remedies, the broadening of the interpretation of
oppression and the willingness of courts to order more drastic remedies has already been
stressed many times574 .
Alternative remedies are supposedly less severe and as such best used when the
majority is not engaged in constant wrongful conduct. Thus, when dissension is linked to
one issue and there is a reasonable likelihood that once it is solved the business will be
operated smoothly. In such situation a milder remedy is more likely to ease dissension " 75 .
Stated differently, alternative remedies work best where they are least needed, in
resolving trivial disagreements 576 .
Some states have explicit laundry list of alternative remedies for all corporations" 77 .
Those with close corporation statute often limited various alternative reliefs to these
corporations 578 . A few states broadly authorize courts to provide any equitable relief that
is deemed appropriate 579 .
The remedies usually listed are: removal and appointment of directors and officers,
setting aside corporate action, cancellation of charter and bylaw provisions, accounting,
572 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 26
73
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 19-20
574 Murdock, supra note 31 at 461; Arthur D. Spratlin, Jr., Modern remediesfor oppression in the closely
held corporation, 60 Miss. L. J. 405. 418 (1990)
575
Bahls, supra note 1 94 at 3 1 1 , 328-329
576
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 2
1
577
E.g. Illinois, Maine, North Carolina, South Carolina
78
E.g. Arizona, Maryland, New York (buy out for close corporations), Montana, Wisconsin.
79
California and North Dakota and similar but only for close corporations Arizona, Texas and Wisconsin.
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appointment of custodians, receivers and provisional directors, dividend payment and
award of damages' 80 .
Some statutes explicitly recognize that the list of ordinary reliefs is merely
representative and that courts retain power to order any other relief not cited in the list
that seems appropriate' 8 '. Thus many states legislatures reaffirmed courts power to
fashion broad and creative equitable relief 82 . Accordingly, courts have held that
alternative reliefs can be granted on equitable grounds even though not available in the
statute
583
. In Alaska Plastics Inc. v. Coppock5*'1 , for instance, the court stated that trial
courts have the power to provide alternative remedies. While in Balvik v. Sylvester3*3 the
court listed ten possible alternative remedies that court can fashion in equity, including a
mandatory buy out. In jurisdiction where courts refused to use their equity power the
statutory list becomes exclusive.
The trial courts play a predominant in alternative remedies cases b.ecause the
appellate court usually confirm judgments of the trial level. These deference to the trial
judge is justified by the unique opportunity the judge has to view all the facts in their
totality
586
.
Here to a valid question is if the same level of oppression is required to get an
alternative relief, as is necessary to get a dissolution or buy out ? (supra VI.A.2. and infra
VLB. 3.) Some statutes explicitly state that alternative reliefs can be sought for less
580 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 41(a)
581
e.g. S.C. Code Ann. §33-14-310 .
58:
Bahls, supra note 194 at 288 (supra V ?? for a discussion of the history of courts recognizing their rights
to fashion equitable relief in the corporate context, and the relation, between enactment of a list of
alternative remedies and equity power, and between close corporate statutes and general corporate codes)
583
Henderson, supra note 349 at 214; Bahls, supra note 194 at 313-315
58
'621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980)
585 411 N. W.2d383(N. D. 1987)
586 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 41
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egregious conduct than that necessary to trigger dissolution" 87 . It appears in general that
courts use alternatives for lesser degree of oppression588 .
While alternative reliefs seem to be less drastic, more adapted remedies, they have
some major drawbacks. Alternative remedies are a burden for the judicial system. Firstly
their is a risk of recurring litigation. Alternative remedies do not terminate the corporate
coexistence. If a party is engaged in a scheme of oppression, such remedies will only
delay the unavoidable dissolution or buy out. Secondly courts should not order remedies
that they cannot monitor and in force. Enforceability is however jeopardized by a bad
faith (or incompetent) majority589 . Finally alternative remedies are most of the times
impractical because to expensive. In fact alternative remedies play a role as "prophylactic
measures" while the merits of a dissolution or buy out suit are being debated. To attempt
to reach long term solutions under these remedies seems unrealistic if not unwise 590 . For
those who see buy out as the natural remedy for dissension, alternative remedies are
superfluous "and lead to an arbitrary and inefficient state of affairs,,59, . Despite the
widespread inclusion of alternative remedies in statutes they are not used often592 .
Alternative remedies have been classified in various ways. The "supplement" has a
system of tiering of remedies. Dissolution is the last resort remedy after then buy out.
Both are "extraordinary" reliefs. The alternative remedies are "ordinary"' remedies who's
application must be evaluated in first instance593 . Alternative remedies have also been
587
E.g. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-14-310
588 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 63
589
Bahls, supra note 194 at 306-307
590
Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 25
591 Adam Chernichaw, Note, Oppressed shareholders in close corporations: a market oriented statutory-
remedy, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 501, 516 (1994)
592 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 723
593 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. §41-43
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named "remedies allowing continued co-ownership" 594 . This classification emphasizes
the non-definitive character of these solutions. Many of the alternative remedies are so
called "third party devices". They bring in an outsider to resolve the dispute 595 . Remedies
can also be distinguished by the ground on which they are sought, oppression statute or
breach of fiduciary duties. Breach of fiduciary duties allows a plaintiff to request
preliminary injunctive, final equitable and monetary relief596 .
2. The principal alternative remedies
a. Order compelling dividend payment
For an unemployed shareholder of a close corporation, failure to pay dividend
deprives him from any return on investment. Some courts have therefore issued orders
compelling dividend payment 597 . Although such orders are not to burdensome for the
majority and often provide to the minority the desired relief courts require a high standard
of proof. Arbitrary, fraudulent or bad faith action must be proved to overcome courts
reluctancy, strengthen by the business judgment rule presumption598 . An additional
difficulty is to determine the amount of dividends that should be paid"99 . Courts have
1)4
Bahls, supra note 194 at 306-307 (partitioning, however, like dissolution and buy out is a definitive
remedy)
95 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 26 (using this classification for a provisional director, custodial receiver
or arbitrator)
16 Thomas P. Billings, Remediesfor the aggrieved shareholder in close corporation, 81 Mass. L. Rev. 3, 5-
9(1996)
97
Crowley v. Communications for Hospitals, Inc. 30 Mass App. Ct. 751 (1991); Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.
2d 58, 62 (Miss. 1982); (See also supra. ??? for orders compelling dividend payments)
598
Bahls, supra note 194 at 308
599 O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104 at §3:05 list factors court should weigh before declaring a
dividend: 1) amount of surplus in the corporation 2) ratio of current assets to current liabilities 3) working
capital needed by the business 4) working capital retained in prior years 5) business prospects 6) possible
future liabilities 7) whether a majority shareholder used his/her controlling position for his her own benefit
8) any special interests that are not shared by the minority shareholders in keeping the interest minimal.
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sometimes ordered that reasonable dividend be paid in the future to overcome the ad-hoc
solution character of dividend payment orders600 . The need for flexibility of such long
term orders prevent them to specify any amount60 '.
b. Third party devices
Courts do not frequently use third party devices602 . The main advantage, of
appointing people to exercise a role in the corporation, is that they will in effect play the
role of in-house arbitrators. Especially in family owned businesses they can play a crucial
role to resolve disputes, force key resignations and restructure the balance of power603 .
Judicially monitored management is costly both injudicial expenses and lost
opportunities. Judicial manages have a tendency to preserve the status-quo. Since they
have no interest in the corporation, they are reluctant towards any innovative or
aggressive initiative604 .
(i) Receivers (or Custodians)
Are usually appointed to liquidate the corporation, occasionally to manage it if a
dissolution is impracticable or unnecessary. Custodians in effect temporarily replaces the
board of directors and the officers605 . In some state courts can also order direct judicial
supervision. Receivers, however are not an ideal solution. They make customers and
600 Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201 (1981) (on appeals the court found that such
order needs to be more precise)
601
Bahls, supra note 194 at 308
60:
Id,
003
Id. at 308-309
604
Hetherington, Illiquidity. supra note 29 at 25-26
605 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 28
creditors nervous. Moreover they are to expensive for most close corporations. If the
receive is incompetent he may injure the business to an extent that parties would have
been better of with an immediate dissolution*106 . These remedies have rarely been
ordered607 .
(ii). Provisional directors and Fiscal agents
Provisional directors and fiscal agents have fewer powers than custodian and
receivers. Provisional directors have only one vote and thus cannot manage the whole
business. Their role is less intrusive than that of a receiver and thus less damaging608 .
They are ideal to resolve deadlock609 . Courts appoint them almost exclusively on statutory
grounds610 . The majority can theoretically always dismiss the provisional director without
court approval. In equity jurisdiction a charter provision could be necessary6 ". Normally
once the director has plaid is role as tie breaker and the harmony is restored the court will
dismiss him612 . An objection to provisional directors is that no public policy reason justify
depriving the blocking group from his veto. Veto powers are essential property rights,
often bargained for by minorities to be protected. However, some deadlock require to be
broken in everybody's interest. Even though it is true that the appointment of a
606
Bahls, supra note 194 at 309
dl
Hetherington. I(liquidity, supra note 29 at 24; In Delaware however the remedy is more used because it
is the only one available in case of shareholder dissension, Thompson. Shareholder's Cause, supra note 24
at 723 n. 164
608 Haynsworth, supra note 3 1 6 at 27
609
Id at 26
610 Corporate statutes having listed the remedy are e.g. : California. Maine, New Jersey, Ohio. Close
corporate statutes listing it are: Delaware, Kansas, Montana. Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin.
611 Haynsworth, supra note 316 at 27
612 Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 21
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provisional director may push one of the parties in a minority position for a period of time
on a whole range of issues where no intervention was necessary61 \
Fiscal agents have a limited power to review expenses. Parties can then petition for
relief 14 .
c. Surgically -Fashioned remedies
Those remedies result mostly from the use of the courts of their equitable powers.
Their flexibility reflect the willingness of courts to recognize the complexity and
factualness of close corporation disputes. Courts have ordered removal of directors,
payment of salaries, nullification of corporate action and accounting615 . The preliminary
injunctive relief for breach of fiduciary duty also fits in this category. They consist mainly
of injunctions prohibiting, e.g., termination of employment616 .
d. Partitioning of property
Is an alternative to buy out. A division in viable units must be feasible. In
Consequence, few corporation qualify. The main advantage of partitioning is that it offers
a definitive solution where parties still can see their reasonable expectations fulfilled. The
complexity of such order however reduces the likelihood that courts will consider it617 .
613
Id. at 22
614
Bahls, supra note 194 at 3 10
615
Id. at 311
616
Billings, supra note 280, 596 at 5
617
Bahls, supra note 194 at 305-306
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e. Damages
Are also a result of tort actions or actions for breach of fiduciary duties
61 x
. They can
be awarded for stock repurchase below fair value, for wrongful termination
614
and for
overcompensation620 .
3. Standards for finding the appropriate remedy
Neither courts nor statutes have focussed on standards to select the appropriate
remedy. If they did so they tried to balance the hardship the remedy caused to the
minority, majority, other businesses and the public621 . Hetherington and Dooley avoid the
question of selection by proposing one exclusive remedy, i.e., buy out622 .
The "supplement' ' does not really provide a standard for choosing the appropriate
remedy however it provides that alternative remedies should be evaluated before buy out
and buy out before dissolution623 . Courts need however broad discretion to fashion a
remedy. Therefore "the supplement" explicitly refuses to provide detailed standards. It
mentions precedents of courts using equity power as a useful guide624 .
However broad standards could bring about legal certainty without unduly
restricting courts remedial adaptability62 ". A good standard is socially efficient. This
618
Billings, supra note 280, 596 at 6-9
619 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E. 2d 657 (1976) (he was awarded as
damages "the salary he would have received had he remained an officer and director")
6:0 Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (aberrant overcompensation gave rise to a direct
action, damages were awarded)
621
Bahls, supra note 1 94 at 3 1 5-3 1
6
622 Hetherington, Illiquidity, supra note 29 at 34-59
6:3 Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp. § 41-43
624
Id. at § 41 (official comment)
625
Bahls, supra note 194 at 3 16
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means that it is equitable because it protects reasonable expectations of parties and
redistributes income in accordance with the proportionate interest of the participants. The
standard is also efficient in that it minimizes economic waste (value but also more
subjective elements as "goodwiir)626 .
Bahls proposes a standard for selecting remedies not to rigid as to lead to
inappropriate results and not to flexible as to amount to a simple admonishment to
consider facts and circumstances. In an oppression case following standards of selection
should be considered:
(1) The remedy should maximize the ability of minority shareholders to realize their
reasonable expectations. The use of this standard is certainly appropriate since courts use
it in first instance to decide if they will grant relief. When this is not possible for both
parties it is supposedly because dissolution or buy out is more appropriate (2) the remedy
should minimize the administrative costs associated with resolving the dissension.
Concerns problems of procedural expenses, recurring litigation and enforceability (3) The
remedy should maximize the value of the economic unit while allowing shareholders to
realize the value in accordance with their reasonable expectations. Thus, not only avoid
net loss, but also maximize the ability of the corporation to attract future financing
4. A flexible corporate law
Statutes should provide exhaustive (non exclusive) lists of alternative remedies.
The availability of such remedies increases the flexibility of the law. In the corporate
context such flexibility is necessary to adapt to the facts of each case. Courts should not
be put in a situation where they can only choose between dissolution and buy out.
6:6 Id at 3 1 8-320 (citing W Hirsh, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 4
(1988))
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Nevertheless it must be admitted and kept in mind that alternative remedies are not
always adapted. The situation in which they can be used efficiently are very rare. In fact
only for superficial dissension in close corporation who can afford the price of those
remedies.
C. Shareholder agreements and other protections
1 . Agreements, efficient but rare
Shareholders' agreements are certainly the most economic alternative to judicial
conflict resolution627 . A well drafted agreement will not only allow smooth conflict
resolution but will deter and forbid oppressive conduct. Moreover, they can be tailored to
the specific needs of each close corporation.
For optimal agreements it must be assumed that the general or the close corporate
law is so flexible as to permit various contractual provisions. As we saw (supra II) it can
generally be stated that this is the case, certainly for close corporations.
Undeniable is that shareholder agreements, how well drafted, cannot resolve and
anticipate every form of oppression628 . The imagination of oppressive shareholders and
the variety of techniques can never be fully covered. Agreements are also often drafted on
the false assumption that participants will wish to continue to manage the business
together. A doubtable assumption in case of serious dissension629 . Moreover, as
discussed, the expectations of future close corporate shareholders are based on trust and
confidence. This already restricts their ability to contract. Demonstrating little confidence
627 Brownlee, supra note 320 at 295
628
Hetherington, llliquidity, supra note 29 at 36
629 Id at 37
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to the majority could queer the deal630 . Parties also refuse to contract because they realize
that contractual protection, increases the risk of deadlock and abuse6,1 . Instead of relying
on inaccurate provisions they will prefer to count on, low transaction cost, more reliable
statutory remedies632 .
We discuss briefly below some of the most common agreements. The list is
naturally not exhaustive
a. Buy out agreement
A buy out agreement regulates withdrawal of investment under a set of given
circumstances or at will6j\ Classically, withdrawal will be allowed if the majority
engages in a squeeze out or if corporate employment is terminated. The majority is than
bound to purchase the shares of the withdrawing shareholder. Eventually the right to
dissolve the corporation is provided in cases of refusal to purchase by the majority.
Buy/sell shoot-out agreements are also frequent. A shareholder can offer to buy the shares
of other shareholders, who than in turn can offer to purchase offeror's stock on the same
terms6 ""4 . Well drafted buy out provisions provide methods of valuation or refer to an
independent third party if no fixed price is determined. Like for court ordered buy outs,
buy out agreement have as major drawback the financial burden they put on the
corporation and its shareholders635 .
630
Id. at 36-37
631 Thompson, Shareholder 's Cause, supra note 24 at 705
6,2
Shishido, supra 5 1 1 note at 92-93
633 Brownlee, supra note 320 at 298 -300 (for a description of the content of buy out agreements)
634 Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 30
635
Id. at 30, 91 ("buy out arrangement ... in many situations will be impractical because of the expense)
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b. Compulsory dividend agreements
Require the corporation to declare dividend under defined circumstances. Usually,
when sources of dividend grow beyond a certain level. If dividends are withhold the
agreement can provide that the minority can elect a majority of directors. Dividend policy
will immediately be redressed636 . Two consideration should guide such agreements. First
that it is often fiscally wiser to distribute earnings via salary than via dividends. Second
that enough flexibility should be retained such as to permit investment of earnings for
corporate expansion or adaptation.
c. Employment contracts
Sensible employment contracts covering long periods with defined salaries,
eventually adaptable to the corporations' profitability, provide essential protection637 .
However, such agreements collide with the employment at will doctrine. A doctrine that
has been reevaluated in close corporations (supra ?? pedro ? for instance). Golden
parachute provisions sometimes allow to circumscribe this hurdles.
d. Minority veto power
To directors or shareholders. Guarantees participation of the minority in the
decision making process6 ' 8 . Those provisions increase potential deadlocks.
636 Brownlee, supra note 320 at 304
637
Id. at 302-304
638
Id. at 301-302
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e. Arbitration.
Most state enforce arbitration agreements634 . They can be used to solve intra
corporate disputes. They are certainly successful for valuation of shareholders' stock. But
less for deep rooted shareholders conflict640 .
f. Other protective provisions
Are meant: non compete covenants and preemptive rights (right of first refusal).
The first provision protect the shareholders from disruptive competition of co-
shareholders. While the seconds protect minority (and majority) from unwanted (and
potentially oppressive) co-venturers. They also allow to avoid dilution of the shares of the
minority. 641 Many other clauses are used in shareholder agreements. E.g. so called anti
Donahue clauses restricting the fiduciary duties of the close corporate participants or
other agreements exculpating directors and officers, indemnity clauses and clauses
concerning third beneficiaries642 .
2. Other protections
We briefly mention a few other remedies that can be invoked in oppression cases64j .
If a purchase of stock is involved securities law can be invoked. The catch all rule 10b5 644
concerning employment of manipulative and deceptive devices plays a prominent role in
,Q
Haynsworth, supra note 3 16 at 29
640 Brownlee, supra note 320 at 306-307
641
Id. at 300-301
64:
Billings, supra note 280, 596 at 20-22 (discussing some of these clauses)
643 See generally, O'NEAL'S, OPPRESSION, supra note 104
644
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
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share transfer litigation. For going private transaction and freeze out mergers rescision or
damages can be obtained (rescissory damages or principal plus interest damages)645 .
Finally, as an exclusive remedy, appraisal is possible. Appraisal can be invoked for
essential corporate changes646 . In close corporations courts have accepted a broader range
of actions that trigger dissenter's rights647 .
My
Billings, supra note 280, 596 at 10-12 (discussing remedies for freeze out going private transactions);
See generally Crago, supra note 215 (for a discussion of cash out mergers in close corporations, compared
to public corporations and the available remedies)
46 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.02 (for a merger plan, a share exchange plan, for sale of substantial corporate
property, for important amendments to the articles of incorporation)
647 Anthony, supra note 510 at 1 183 (citing Whetstone v. Hossfeld Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d 380, 381-382
(Minn. 1990))
Chapter VII. Conclusion
The content of corporate law is defined by a few considerations. It must lower
transaction cost by providing the provisions parties would have bargained for. The so
called standard contract function of corporate law. Corporate law must also provide
protection for parties who are not in a position to do so. Corporate law protects outsiders
and insiders. Outsiders, like for instance, creditors and costumers are protected with rules
concerning disclosure of financial information or rules concerning liability and
representation. For insiders, it is the minority who is in need of protection. Ideally they
will bargain for it. This is why corporate law and especially the law of close corporation
is increasingly flexible. However, in most cases they do not. Corporate law must then
provide default protection rules.
The dissolution and buy out remedy are expressions of these default rules. The
availability of such drastic remedies is supported by three policy choices.
Investors in a corporations decide to dedicate their participation to a common
business goal. The risk of failure must be supported by al investments commonly and
equally (meaning, in most cases proportionality). Shareholders cannot withdraw without
that their investments bear the loss due to failure. However, shareholders obligation to
support the risk is limited by the right not to be oppressed. Oppression is measured as a
frustration of reasonable expectations. When the oppressive conduct also amounts to fault
and wrongdoing by the majority interventions seems obvious. But frustration of
reasonable expectations is sometimes simply dictated by sound business considerations.
The frustration is caused by the necessity of the corporation to adapt to business failure.
The participants in fact did a wrong investment. Should the minority then still be
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protected ? Reasonable expectations in such cases are not frustrated because the minority
is fired or receives a lesser dividend. The oppressions lays in the distribution of the
burden of the failure. The minority should not bear higher costs of failure than the
majority. To the extent majority allocates a disproportionate amount of failure to the
minority, they oppress. Even though externally, majority's decisions seem motivated by
sound business judgment.
The second consideration supporting dissolution and buy out is that the necessity of
intervention prevails permanence. Minority shareholders cannot expect withdrawal at will
but they have the right to expect judicial intervention when their "contract" is breached.
Dissolution and buy out reflect this necessity for judicial intervention and the continuous
balancing between permanence and relief. Permanence is one of the main characteristics
of corporations. But permanence is two sided. No investment can be considered
permanent with disregard to the behavior of those who manage the investment. This right
to withdraw is triggered by the misbehavior of those who profit most of the stability of
the financial structure of the corporation. It should thus prevail over corporate
permanency.
Thirdly, serious dissension can only be solved by withdrawal of a party. In close
corporations good will and friendly cooperation is essential for day to day operations.
When dissension is deep rooted only withdrawal can bring relief. All other solutions are
ephemeral and unrealistic.
The availability of buy out more than any other remedy transformed the position of,
previously helpless, minority shareholders. Dissolution only guarantees to the minority
liquidation value minus expenses. Thus, dissolution while a tremendous threat for a
majority who wants to continue the business, because it could result in liquidation, is not
optimal for the minority. Only when the dissolution procedure is used as additional
leverage in a buy out negotiation, is it useful. Dissolution plays then the role of price
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fixing mechanism. Thus, dissolution is in most cases an unnecessary step. The result
aimed at by both parties is buy out. The right to directly request buy out reflects this aim.
It also allows to value the shares at a higher value than liquidation value. This is
indispensable when oppression resulted in a worthless corporation and the majority is
willing to dissolve. Direct buy out has then a fully remedial function. Finally, buy out is
more acceptable to cautious judges, who still distrust dissolution, because it is so drastic.
Other alternative remedies are adapted for lesser conflicts. The context in which
they can be used efficiently is rare. They are or too expensive for little close corporations.
This is the case of third party devices. Or they are ephemeral. For instance, an order to
compel dividends. While the applicability of alternative remedies is not totally excluded,
their unimportance is reflected by the few amount of cases where they were ordered.
Buy out is not a perfect solution. The remedy is slow, valuation is unpredictable
and the procedure is costly. However, considering the whole panoply of remedies, the
availability of buy out appears to be indispensable. From the three definitive remedies,
(dissolution, buy out and partitioning) buy out is the most practical. It is certainly more
adapted, for a healthy business, than dissolution. Buy out redressed the balance of powers
between the majority and the minority more than any other remedy. This thesis therefore
concludes by pleading for a widespread acceptance of the right to directly request buy out
in case of oppression.
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